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ABSTRACT
EVALUATION OF ATTENTION AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL WITHIN A
MODEL OF Gf-Gc COGNITIVE FUNCTIONING

By
Adam C. Scheller
June 23, 2008

Dissertation Supervised by Jeffrey Miller, Ph.D., ABPP
The Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998) guided the
development of most contemporary cognitive ability tests (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004;
Wechsler, 2003), as it enumerates general cognitive ability through the evaluation of its
multiple components. This study involved an investigation of the Gf-Gc domains
including added attention and executive control domains, which was measured by the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (WISC-IV) and Conners’
Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These domains were compared via
factor analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II.
In addition, Structural Equation Modeling was used to test the structure of the
Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003), particularly the primacy of
attention and the interaction of executive control with other cognitive skills. The current
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ABSTRACT (CONT.)
study provided support for the addition of separate attention (Gat) executive control (Gec)
components within a Gf-Gc cognitive model. In addition, a significant interaction was
found between attention and processing speed, which supports attention as a primary
cognitive skill.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Significance of the Problem
The empirical evaluation of human cognitive functioning has intrigued our

species for decades. Dating back to the 1800’s, Francis Galton initiated the revolution of
measuring human ability, including the ability to complete tasks that require intricate
thinking skills (Plucker, 2003). Throughout history the theories and methods for human
cognitive evaluation have been developed and revised to include newer and more
accurate components. Currently, the Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan,
1998) guides the theory behind most cognitive ability tests (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004;
Wechsler, 2003), as it enumerates general ability through the evaluation of its multiple
components.
The main purpose of this study is to continue investigation of cognitive
assessment, and in particular Gf-Gc theory. While largely comprehensive, including 16
stratum II (broad) and 99 stratum I (narrow) skills, the Gf-Gc theory does not account for
a person’s ability to control subsystems, skills, and behaviors, or the ability of a person to
attend to tasks. The inclusion of executive control and attention components to this
theory will further broaden the scope and thus improve the validity of contemporary
cognitive assessment.
Several contemporary studies (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005; Floyd,
Bergeron, & Hamilton, 2005; Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & Kranzler, 2006;
Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Wechsler, 2003) have analyzed the
relationship between cognitive assessment, attention, and executive abilities, but none
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have attempted to explore the possibility of a higher order processing relationship
between cognitive skills that includes all of the current Gf-Gc components, as well as
executive control and attention. This study will attempt such an analysis in order to add
to the vast lineage of human ability analysis.
1.2

Processing
Throughout his career A.R. Luria (1966, 1973, & 1980) investigated the brain’s

involvement in complex behavior. He explained human cognition within three functional
systems. These systems are associated with different anatomical regions in the brain. The
first system controls arousal or cortical tone, which allows us to focus attention (Luria,
1973). Luria associated the first system with the brain stem, diencephalon, and medial
regions. The second system controls analysis, management, and storage of data input
from the external world (Luria, 1966; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). The second system
involves occipital, parietal, and temporal lobe regulation. Finally, the third system
necessitates the planning and organization of behavior through hypothesis generation,
planning, and self-monitoring (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman,
2004; Luria, 1973). The third system is associated with frontal lobe regulation (Das et al.,
1994).
Luria’s (1973) model of executive functioning (EF) is explained as a cognitive
processing approach that follows a hierarchical organization of dominance within
cognitive systems. Based on Luria’s (1966, 1970, 1973, & 1980) EF model,
contemporary researchers have validated and extended the processing approach to
cognition (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999;
Reitan, 1988). Also, the importance of a reciprocal interaction, i.e. a “joint operation”
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(Luria, 1970, pg 68.), between the first, second, and third cognitive systems has been
highlighted (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999;
Reitan, 1988). In addition to the processing approach to cognition, another contribution
of this cognitive processing approach is the supposition that attention to task takes
primacy to other cognitive systems (Luria, 1973).
On a similar token to Luria’s (1973) model of cognitive processing, Dean,
Woodcock, Decker, and Schrank (2003) describe the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology
Model. The Dean-Woodcock model explains human cognitive abilities as a process
between higher and lower cognitive functions. The different levels of processing, from
lower to higher, described in the Dean-Woodcock model are distinguished as reflexive,
automatic, and thinking. Each of these levels function in a reciprocal interaction with
each other, which represents a cycle of sensory input, processing, and output (Dean et al.,
2003). Although similar to Luria’s (1973) processing approach, Dean and colleagues
(2003) provide a more detailed rationale for a hierarchy of skills. By introducing their
theory of hierarchical processing, the Dean-Woodcock model sets the stage for the
inclusion of executive functions and attention within a hierarchical cycle of higher and
lower human functions.
1.3

Executive Functioning
The concept of executive functioning (EF) is a topic of continuing debate and

revision. The debate does not exist to reject the existence of a higher-order human
cognitive control system. Rather, research is focused upon what constitutes executive
functioning and how to measure its component features. The neuroanatomical theory
posed by Andrewes (2001) provides an overarching summary of skills completed within
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a hierarchy of cognitive functions. The cognitive functions include: control, organization,
concept formation, and problem solving, as well as attentional ability and certain qualities
of personality.
Andrewes’ (2001) neuroanatomical theory continues to include attention as an
executive function. The theory proposed in this study eliminates attention as an executive
function, and instead explains attention as a stand alone system under executive control
(Baddeley, 2003; Meyer & Kieras, 1997) and having an intimate relationship between
other cognitive systems (Luria, 1973).
Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, and Schwebach (2005) completed a study
investigating the correlation between a child’s attention (Conner’s Continuous
Performance Test: CPT) and their performance on measures of intelligence (Wechsler
Intelligence Test for Children, 3rd ed.: WISC-III; and Cognitive Assessment System:
CAS). They found few significant correlations between the CPT and WISC-III, which
suggests measures of attention and cognitive ability each hold unique variance. The
Naglieri et al. (2005) study supports the analysis of attention as a separate factor affecting
cognitive ability.
Through this current study attention and the executive control mechanism
regulating attention will be examined to determine their relationship with other
predefined Gf-Gc cognitive components (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew, 2003).
As will be further explained in Chapter 2, the discussion of working memory will help
advance the proposed theory of executive control and attention as separate, but
functioning in a complex relationship of hierarchical processing (Baddeley, 2003; Dean
et. al., 2003).
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Along with supporting theory for the separation of EF and attention, EF
development in children is considered here in order to explain an EF hierarchy
phenomenon. That is, EF develops in children with basic functions such as executive
control first, followed by more complex higher order functions such as concept formation
and problem solving (Anderson, 2002; Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, &
Catroppa, 2001; Goldberg & Bilder, 1987; Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001).
For example, motor/impulse control is the first skill fully developed in children (Gioia,
Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000). As will be described further in Chapter 2, control is
the necessary ability for all other executive functions to develop. It lays the basis for
development of the higher-order skills (Barkley, 1997, 1999) such as concept formation
and problem solving, and it is necessary for the proper regulation of attention (Posner &
Peterson 1990).
A hierarchy of cognition (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994) can be conceptualized
with each higher-order skill dependent upon the efficient performance of the previously
developed prerequisite skills. A hierarchical processing model conceptually holds
executive control as a necessary, but not sufficient skill for the performance of higher
order executive functions, such as concept formation, problem solving, and the executive
control of attention.
Support for a hierarchy involving concept formation and control was provided in
a factor analytic study conducted by Minshew, Meyer, and Goldstein (2002), in which
concept formation and concept identification were investigated in children with Autism.
The authors demonstrated that the skill of identifying concepts was separate from abstract
reasoning in children with Autism. They also found that cognitive flexibility (control)
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was an intermediate ability between identification and concept formation (Minshew et.
al., 2002). Their study supports the notion of control as a precursor to concept formation.
Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, and Adams (2005) determined that EF interacts with
both immediate and delayed recall in a hierarchical relationship. Duff et al. (2005)
conducted a canonical analysis of measures of executive functions and memory and
found that EF and memory share 55-60% of variance. As a sidebar to their study, Duff et
al. (2005) noted that despite a relationship being evidenced, directionality could not be
determined. Their study supports the interrelatedness and reciprocal processing of EF and
memory, which raises the question of the relationship between EF and all other cognitive
systems. The lack of causality may support the postulation that EF and other cognitive
functions act within an interrelated global system.
Busch, Booth, McBride, Vanderploeg, Curtiss, and Duchnick (2005) completed a
t-test analysis of the severity of executive dysfunction and performance on tasks of
memory in subjects with head injury. They determined that memory was less related to
executive dysfunction than overall cognitive dysfunction. However, when severity of
cognitive dysfunction was controlled, memory and executive deficits were related based
on the fluidity of the task. This finding indicates that tasks requiring executive cognitive
fluidity were related to executive functions.
Neuroscience examinations of EF reveal frontal lobe involvement in higher-order
cognition (Davies & Rose, 1999; Filley, Young, Reardon, & Wilkening, 1999; Goldberg,
Podell, & Lovell, 1994; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Luria, 1973; Rosenweig, Breedlove, &
Leiman, 2002; Stuss & Benson, 1984). The frontal lobe of the human brain has been
associated with the execution of EF and modulation of other brain systems, such as
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attention (Stuss & Gow, 1992). A neurological disease such as Huntington’s Disease may
offer a picture of what executive dysfunction involves. The frontal lobe atrophy caused
by this disorder leads to deficits of executive functioning (Andrewes, 2001; adapted from
Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990; and Cummings and Coffey, 2000) such as
disinhibition, dysfluency, and difficulty planning (Andrewes, 2001).
Barkley (1997), in his description of executive function, identifies behavioral
inhibition as the mediator for the competent performance of four executive abilities:
working memory, internalization of speech, self-regulation of affect/motivation/arousal,
and reconstitution (which explains goal directed behaviors of the motor system).
Barkley’s model of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder provides support for the
argument of a hierarchy of EF investigated in this study, with control being necessary but
not sufficient for higher executive skills.
Another important executive system theory that supports a hierarchical cognitive
process is called the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) (Norman & Shallice, 1986).
In this theory, the SAS acts as a mediator of sensory information and preexisting schemas
when behavior is not automatic (Andrewes, 2001). Automaticity of behavior determines
whether or not the SAS becomes involved. The SAS takes over behavioral control when
(1) no preexisting schema is available for the stimuli, (2) two or more schemas are
appropriate, (3) the strongest schema associated is inappropriate for the situation, or (4)
the consequences of the wrong schema selection are dangerous. By defining the
Supervisory Attentional System in this manner, which in itself is a key component to the
executive attention system described by Andrewes (2001), Norman and Shallice (1986)
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provide support for the separation of EF and attention. The complex relationship between
EF and attention will be investigated further in the literature review of this study.
The separation of control, concept formation, problem solving, and executive
attention as distinct skills is supported by Luria’s (1973) description of executive
functioning as the performance of goal directed behaviors, which can be viewed as a
domain of possible outcomes from the control, planning, organization, and integration
roles of more basic cognitive functions. Recall Luria’s (1973) model of executive
functioning, which follows a cognitive processing approach and assumes the hierarchical
dominance of cognitive modulation systems. Luria’s processing approach will be a
foundational key in this research by supporting the interconnectedness of EF, attention,
and other cognitive processes.
A single domain score does not provide a valid account of EF because of the
separation and distinction between skills that make up the construct (Messick, 1995). For
example, although interrelated, concept formation and problem solving make up two
different skills that are also measured differently (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Often
the measurement of a construct that includes several component skills is reported through
an index or composite score. For example, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children,
4th ed. (WISC-IV) (Wechsler, 2003) reports an index named perceptual reasoning (PRI).
The perceptual reasoning index is a composite of separate and distinct skills such as
visual motor, visual concept formation, and visual discrimination. In contrast to viewing
executive functioning as a single construct, research has indicated that the components of
an EF domain reflect fundamental separate resources (Denkla, 1996; Boone, Ponton,
Gorsuch, Gonzalez, & Miller, 1998).
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1.4

Cattell-Horn-Carroll (current model) – Transformation into current theory
Contemporary Gf-Gc theory (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998)

accounts for fundamental cognitive domain skills in its definition of the broad stratum II.
Based on the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC; name, 1993) integrated Gf-Gc model, McGrew
(2003) explains a working definition of the CHC theory, which categorizes abilities into
16 separate domains of functioning, called Broad (stratum II) domains. These broad
definitions are further broken down into 99 Narrow (stratum I) definitions that account
for comprehensive investigations of the factors that are included in stratum II domains.
Gf-Gc theory explains cognition based on a comprehensive evaluation of multiple abilities
(McGrew, 2003).
A discussion describing the comprehensive CHC theory of cognition is relevant
to this study for the purpose of providing a framework for subsequent data analysis. The
CHC theory has been couched as an all encompassing evaluation of human cognitive
ability. Current intelligence tests for children base most of their measures on these broad
and narrow CHC facets of cognition (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Keith et al., 2006;
Wechsler, 2003).
McGrew (2003) is further investigating stratum II and stratum I in Gf-Gc
cognitive ability through a working model, which is updated as relevant research is
completed. Recent empirical evidence validates the broad abilities Gf, Gc, Gv, Gsm, Glr,
Gs, Gq (quantitative knowledge), and Grw (reading/writing) as structural components of
the model (McGrew, 2003). The presence of Gq and Grw reflects the integration of
achievement into the CHC model.
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In addition, Keith et al. (2006) completed a higher order confirmatory factor
analysis of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition (Wechsler, 2003).
Keith et al. (2006) challenged the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2003) factor structure of verbal
comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed by
validating a factor model that resembles CHC cognitive structure. Their study further
validates the model in this investigation of the WISC-IV’s measurement of cognitive
components.
1.5

Where it’s going
The application of the processing approach (Luria 1966a, 1966b, 1973, & 1980)

within the component cognitive Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003) has been validated
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) and a hierarchical processing organization of cognition has
been postulated (Dean et al., 2003); however, a cognitive organization that includes
attention and EF (Goldberg, 1987) within that system has not been fully explored. Floyd,
Bergeron, and Hamilton (2005) completed a joint exploratory factor analysis of subtests
from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System and the Woodcock-Johnson III Tests
of Cognitive Abilities to determine the relationship between executive functions and GfGc cognitive components. Their study determined that both EF and cognitive ability tasks
measure the same general construct. However, their explanation lacked a clear definition
of EF skills, as well as an organization of each EF skill within an integrated model. Also,
the analysis of this study did not take into account the processing relationship between
cognitive systems (Dean et al., 2003) or the primacy of attention within the system
(Luria, 1973).
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1.6

Problem Statement
The purpose of this study is to continue investigation of the Gf-Gc theory and

expand the Keith et al. (2006) validation of Gf-Gc measurement by the WISC-IV. A
hierarchical processing organization, which may accurately explain the relationship
between executive functions, should be applied to the inclusion of a new executive
control (Gec) component and a separate attention component (Gat) within the Gf-Gc
theory. We propose the necessary inclusion of executive control (Gec) and a separate
attention factor (Gat), within a factorial organization of Gf-Gc cognitive measurement.
This study involves an investigation of the Gf-Gc domains measured by Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous
Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These domains will be compared via factor
analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II. The WISC-IV, which measures Gf-Gc cognitive
components (Keith et al., 2006; Wechsler, 2003), proposes the measurement of novel
problem solving and concept formation; however, there is evidence that traditional
intelligence testing does not appropriately evaluate executive functions, including
executive control (Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000).
Also, the relationship of these cognitive components remains in question. The
hierarchical processing theory is supported by McGrew’s (2003) WJ III CHC
Information Processing Model. In this model McGrew (2003) identifies processing speed
and working memory as constructs that function separately and above or predictive of
Spearman’s g (1927) and other stratum II cognitive components. The CHC Information
Processing Model (McGrew, 2003) also provides support of a process between cognitive
components in the Gf-Gc theory.
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The second main purpose of this research is to test the structure of the DeanWoodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003). Given the fundamentals of
cognitive processing proposed by contemporary research, questions arise as to the
structural integrity of the Dean-Woodcock model. In particular, Luria (1966, 1973, &
1980) explained human cognition as the process between three systems, with primacy
given to attention (Luria, 1973). Also, working memory has since been validated as a
process between short term memory, long term memory, and executive control
(Baddeley, 2003), which is not accounted for by the Dean et al. (2003) model. Therefore,
the inclusion of Gec and Gat components questions the primacy of each component within
the Dean-Woodcock (2003) model. Analysis of the cognitive domains measured by the
WISC-IV, and attention and executive control, as measured by the CPT-II, will shed light
on the relationship between executive control, attention, and measures of cognitive ability
in children.
Below (Figure 1.1) is a preview of the modified Dean Woodcock
Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a primary component, to be tested in
this study. This model guides the second step of this research study by providing a
framework for analyzing the relationship between cognitive components. The model will
be further explained in Chapter 3, Variables and Models.
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Figure 1.1 Modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a
primary component

Gf
Stores of
Acquired
Knowledge

(Gc)

Gv

Gsm

Gs

Gec

Gat

Gec=
Gs=
Gat=
Gsm=
Gf=
Gv=
G c=

1.7

Executive Control
Processing Speed
Attention
Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness
Fluid Intelligence
Visual Spatial Ability
Crystallized Intelligence

Research Questions
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al. (2006)
literature, with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).
a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is
accounted for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
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b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted
for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control,
and CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will
be dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive
control in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent
on the hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by
Figure 1.1, with respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al,
2003) accurately represent the relationship between cognitive
components?
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Processing Theory
Luria explained cognitive functioning as a process between cognitive systems

(1966, 1973, & 1980). The concept of processing between systems differs from the basic
Gf-Gc (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew, 2003) method, which analyzes separate
abilities. Luria’s seminal works investigated the brain’s involvement in complex
behavior. He explained cognitive processing within three functional systems that can be
associated with separate anatomical brain regions.
Luria’s (1973) first system includes the ability to sustain attention. The first
system is the basis for the cognitive processing model. Attention is necessary for the
performance of information acquisition and processing (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994).
This system is associated with the brain stem, diencephalon, and medial regions. These
brain regions are responsible for arousal and cortical tone, which affect the adequate
maintenance of attention (Stuss & Benson, 1984).
The second cognitive system is responsible for the integration of sensory input
and complex planning/organizational skills (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Reitan, 1988).
This system accounts for cognitive memory functions, in that it is this system that
controls the analysis, management, and storage of data input from the external world
(Luria, 1966; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). The data integration and storage system is
associated with temporal, frontal, cerebellar, hippocampal, and occipital lobe regulation
(Rosenzweig, Breedlove, Leiman, 2002).
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The final system involves the planning and organization of behavior, based on the
data integrated and stored through the second system. This organized behavior occurs
through hypothesis generation, planning, and self-monitoring (Das et al, 1994; Kaufman
& Kaufman, 2004; Luria, 1973). The third system is associated with frontal lobe
regulation (Das et al., 1994; Reitan, 1988; Stuss & Benson, 1984). This executive
functioning system also follows a cognitive processing approach, which conforms to a
hierarchical organization of dominance within cognitive systems (Luria 1966, 1973, &
1980).
The processing approach to cognition (Das et al, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman,
2004; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988) is supported by current test construction, such as the
KABC-II (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), and cognitive theory, such as the DeanWoodcock Neuropsychology model (Dean, Woodcock, Decker, & Schrank, 2003). The
KABC-II and Dean-Woodcock theory are similar to Luria’s (1966, 1973, & 1980) model
of cognitive processing, which identifies the importance of a reciprocal interaction
between the first, second, and third cognitive systems (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994;
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; Luria, 1970; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988).
The Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003), explains
human cognitive abilities as a process between higher and lower cognitive functions. The
Dean-Woodcock model discriminates from lower to higher skills as reflexive, automatic,
and thinking. The skills function in a reciprocal interaction similar to Luria’s (1966,
1973, & 1980) explanation of the first, second, and third cognitive systems. The Dean et
al. (2003) model represents a cycle of sensory input, processing, and output. Although
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similar to Luria’s (1973) processing approach, Dean and colleagues (2003) provide a
more detailed rationale for a hierarchy of skills.
Dean et al. (2003) advocate for a hierarchy of skills within an informationprocessing model. While sensory and motor functions are analyzed at input and output
levels (reflexive), they set the stage for the effective performance of “thinking” level
skills. The Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology model explains that novel reasoning
cannot occur without first activation of the sensory register, and then conscious
awareness. Following conscious awareness, the analysis of stimuli occurs (through
tactile-kinesthetic thinking, visual-spatial processing, and/or auditory processing). The
long-term storage-retrieval ability is then stimulated prior to active transformation of
stimuli to an output answer, also known as novel reasoning. This process is differentiated
from “automatic,” for which no active thinking is necessary. Examples of “automatic”
processes are those over-learned skills with which we are fluent.
Dean et al. (2003) note that cognitive performance, motor output, and conscious
awareness of stimuli cannot occur without passing through an executive control system.
The executive control system includes motivation/volition, cognitive style/temperament,
and emotional state. The executive control system acts as a gatekeeper directing the path
of automatic versus non-automatic/novel processes. This system is also responsible for
allocation of attention and monitoring of performance. Dean et al. (2003) include
executive control in their model of cognitive processing, but they explain EF as solely a
control mechanism with personality features. This model is similar to Barkley’s (1997 &
1999) explanation of the behavioral and cognitive dyscontrol found in children with
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ADHD. The construct of executive control will be investigated further in the Executive
Functioning section of this chapter.
Kaufman and Kaufman (2004) developed The Kaufman Assessment Battery for
Children, Second Edition (KABC-II) as a contemporary cognitive battery that begins to
explore the union of Luria’s (1966, 1973, 1980) processing theory and the Gf-Gc model
of human cognition (McGrew & Flangan, 1998). The theoretical approach to developing
the KABC-II is consistent with the focus of this study. The KABC-II provides a piece of
evidence for cognitive processing within a field of study that lacks such investigation.
While the application of the processing approach (Luria 1966a, 1966b, 1973, & 1980)
within the component cognitive Gf-Gc model (McGrew, 2003) has been validated
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), a hierarchical organization of EF (Goldberg, 1987) within
that system has not been fully explored.
2.2

Executive Functioning
A neuroanatomical perspective of Executive Functioning (EF) explains a system

including five sub-domains: (1) control; (2) organization, synthesis, judgment (OSJ); (3)
attention; (4) planning, sequencing, monitoring (PSM); and (5) personality (Andrewes,
2001). This five dimension definition of EF incorporates multiple founding theories in
the area. This neuroanatomical definition will be a key theory for understanding EF this
research study, because it includes and explains the fundamental variables being studied.
Andrewes (2001) definition of EF is differentiated from the Dean et al. (2003)
explanation of executive control, and Barkley’s (1997, 1999) model of behavioral and
cognitive dyscontrol, because it includes problem solving and concept formation as
component skills instead of viewing them as separate constructs.
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Control, OSJ, PSM, Attention, and Personality are dependent on each other and
function based on a hierarchical processing system. Theories of hierarchical cognitive
functions have been postulated (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005), which assume
frontal lobe executive control is critically involved in the hierarchical model (Goldberg &
Bilder, 1987; Stuss & Benson, 1987). The study conducted by Duff et al. (2005)
completed a canonical correlation of executive functions and memory, and determined
that EF and memory share 55-60% of variance. A limitation noted by Duff et al. (2005) is
that despite a relationship being evidenced, directionality could not be determined. This
lack of causality may further support the postulation that EF and cognitive functions act
within an interrelated global system.
Investigators have attempted to refute a hierarchical EF model (Varney &
Stewart, 2004); however, their relationship did not include executive control as a
foundational component. Rather, Varney and Stewart (2004) defined EF as planning and
problem solving of verbal and nonverbal tasks. Their research did, however, support the
definition of EF as a multi-component system as opposed to a single domain score.
As posed in this study, control is the necessary function for the performance of
other “higher level” skills, such as concept formation, problem solving, and insight. One
must possess the ability to control cognitive, attention, motor, and limbic systems in order
to execute dependent skills properly (Barkley 1997, 1999). Goldberg and Bilder (1987)
explain that the hypothesis of hierarchical cognitive control assumes two requirements.
First, sequential organization allows for a dependent relationship between any operation
and the output of the prior operation; and second, previous stages of the cognitive skill
include more general types of the desired skill. Within the hierarchical processing model
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of EF, the base begins with control, followed by concept formation and problem solving,
and ending with features of personality. The ability to form concepts and problem solve
are dependent on the necessary performance of executive cognitive control. While social
organization and motivational components are subsumed as an executive skill, this study
focuses on cognitive skill rather than personality. For the purposes of this research study
personality features will not be included; however, application of a hierarchical
processing analysis between cognitive EF, personality EF, and component cognitive
skills may be an important area of future research.
A hierarchical processing model can provide explanation for common executive
deficits found in children with ADHD. Barkley (1997 & 1999) describes ADHD as a
disorder marked by global dyscontrol. If a child with ADHD is lacking basic cognitive
and behavioral control, then it would serve logical that their higher order executive
functions would be negatively affected. To find support for this theory, one may look to
the common measures used for the evaluation of ADHD in children. Measures of verbal
learning, self-regulation, sequencing, mental flexibility, response/behavioral inhibition,
planning, organization, attention, and working memory (Antshel & Waisbren, 2003;
Barkley, 1997; de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995; Seidman et. al., 2001; Wecker et. al., 2000)
have been employed in batteries used to assess Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders
(ADHD) in children (Antshel & Waisbren, 2003; de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995; Seidman
et. al., 2001; Wecker et. al., 2000). The assessment of ADHD is important in the
understanding of EF, because ADHD is characterized by categorical executive
dysfunction (Mattson et at, 1999).
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2.2.1 Sub-domains of Executive Functioning
2.2.1.1 Control (Flexibility)
Control refers to a person’s ability to vary inhibition of multiple system functions,
including cognition, emotion, language, attention, motor movements, and memory
(Andrewes, 2001; Stuss & Benson, 1987). Flexibility of control is a subset of inhibition,
and therefore is subsumed under control (Andrewes, 2001). The concept of control over
novel situations, of which there is no preexisting schema, is a fundamental function of the
prefrontal cortex (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994). Flexible control describes how a
person inhibits or disinhibits perceptual, cognitive, and response elements (Lezak, 1995),
based on information from a feedback loop (Andrewes, 2001). The feedback loop is an
automatic self-monitoring system that determines whether or not the amount and type of
control resulted in the desired outcome. This loop is based on sensory feedback from the
environment or mechanisms such as biofeedback. Deficit in executive flexibility results
in perseverative and dysfunctional cognition, perception, or response (Lezak, 1995).
Studies have also shown that intact flexibility is positively related to increased
internalization of attributions for desired or positive situations (Garcia, Torrecillas, de
Arcos, & Garcia, 2005).
A distinction can be made between control that is voluntary (effortful) versus
control that is less than voluntary or reactive (Eisenberg, Spinrad, Fabes, Reiser,
Cumberland, Shepard, Valiente, Losoya, Guthrie, & Thompson, 2004). Linked to
anterior cingulate gyrus involvement (Posner & Rothbart, 1998), effortful control
explains voluntary and flexible modulation of attention and activation or inhibition of
behavior. Eisenberg et al. (2004) demonstrated the direct positive relationship between
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effortful control and impulsivity with externalizing behavior, and the indirect relationship
with internalizing problems; however, their research noted the distinct impact of effortful
control and impulsivity to outcomes. Conclusions form the Eisenberg et al. (2004) study
note that children with low impulsivity do not spontaneously attempt new problem
regulatory strategies; and children with low effortful control may not be able to manage
negative emotional states. Thus, it can be predicted that children with low levels of either
effortful control or impulsivity will have low levels of resiliency, possibly increasing the
risk of internalizing problems (Eisenberg et. al., 2004). The addition of effortful control
to the explanation of EF is important to better detail the impact of control on human
behavior, cognition, and emotion.
2.2.1.2 Organization, Synthesis, Judgment (Concept Formation)
Andrewes’ (2001) OSJ describes the function of a person’s concept formation.
Concept formation is the ability to categorize and compare current information and/or
experience with previous learning or experience (Andrewes, 2001). In short it explains a
person’s capacity for abstracting universal or rational concepts (Wang, 1987). Concept
formation is also responsible for a person’s ability to make socially acceptable or
situation based judgments. One must address new information in relation to their
knowledge base (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) and determine how it fits with their
preexisting schemas (Andrewes, 2001). For example, concept formation deficits in
children with Autistic Disorder have been examined (Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein,
2002), which account for their difficulty generalizing learned social skills to novel social
situations.
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The skill of concept formation is believed to be housed in the frontal lobes
(Wang, 1987). It is not affected by level of education, and it follows a specific
developmental pattern (Wang, 1987). Development of concept formation skills in will be
discussed further in the development section of this chapter.
2.2.1.3 Planning, Sequencing, Monitoring (Problem Solving)
Inherent in executive functioning is optimal performance of goal directed
behaviors (Luria, 1973). The neuroanatomical perspective describes planning,
sequencing, and monitoring as necessary for a person’s ability to problem solve
(Andrewes, 2001). It is the ability to plan goal oriented behavior, and self monitor the
problem solving process. This skill is necessary for the identification and organization of
the process and components necessary to achieve a goal (Lezak, 1995). A person can self
monitor via a cognitive and sensory feedback loop. From this feedback a person must
determine if their course is appropriate for the task and modify accordingly (Andrewes,
2001). Deficit in self-correction and self-monitoring may result from an inability to
perceive mistakes, or inaction to correct such mistakes (Lezak, 1995).
Newman, Carpenter, Varma, and Just (2003) explain that the prefrontal cortex is
involved in the function of problem solving. They go on to explain that while there is bihemispheric involvement in planning, a necessary component of problem solving
(Andrewes, 2001), the left and right prefrontal cortices are involved in different stages of
planning. Newman et al. (2003) conclude that the right prefrontal cortex may be more
involved with the generation of a plan, and the left prefrontal cortex may be more
involved in the execution of a plan. As will be described further in the biological basis
section of this chapter, the Newman et al. (2003) conclusion mirrors the novelty-
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routinization approach to frontal lobe functions (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994),
which indicates that novel problem solving is a right frontal lobe function.
2.2.1.4 Personality
The executive manifestation of personality is comprised of drive, social skills, and
insight (Andrewes, 2001). Drive refers to initiation to undertake a task. Persons with
frontal lobe damage can exhibit decreased drive, which can result in an inability to
initiate activities or carry through on a task (Andrewes, 2001; Lezak, 1995).
Impaired social skills can also occur following severe focal frontal lobe damage.
This deficit presents as a person being socially inappropriate, not being able to form
social strategies, and not being able to synthesize social feedback (Andrewes, 2001). A
deficit in social competence can present as crude behavior, or a lack of understanding and
recognition of social norms and mores. Impaired social awareness may result in extreme
forms of politeness (Lezak, 1995).
Insight relates with the ability to compare one’s characteristics, emotions and
social adaptation, to those of others, and in turn modulate one’s behavior and adapt
socially (Andrewes, 2001; Prigatano, 1991). This capacity of self-awareness includes
both the awareness of physical status and the awareness of situational and environmental
contexts (Lezak, 1995).
2.3

Attention
Attention refers to a person’s ability to distribute their focus, also called divided

attention, to different tasks, while simultaneously avoiding situational intrusions
(Andrewes, 2001). The attention component has been left out of the hierarchical
processing model of executive functioning, because attention doesn’t follow conceptually
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with the idea of executive skill. However, attention does include an executive component
and components of attention are included in the cognitive processing model proposed in
this research. For example, Posner and Peterson (1990) described the executive control
system as including control functions of attention such as divided attention, selective
attention, sustained attention, and alertness. Therefore all facets of attention are not
controlled by executive functioning; rather the overarching concept of attention is
modulated by EF. Attention is an important feature of this research and it will be
investigated as existing in a relationship (Luria, 1973) with executive control (Posner &
Peterson, 1990; Meyer & Kieras, 1997) and Gf-Gc (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; McGrew,
2003) cognitive components.
Support for the separation of attention and Gf-Gc cognitive components was
provided by studies showing need for the focused assessment of attention (Naglieri,
Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Manly, Anderson, Nimmo-Smith, Turner,
Watson, & Robertson, 2001). In the Naglieri et al. (2005) study, attention, as measured
by the Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (CPT), and cognitive ability, as measured
by the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children-3rd ed. (WISC-III), were found not to
share significant variance. The lack of significant correlations between the CPT and
WISC-III suggests unique variance for each measure. Similarly, Manly et al. (2001)
found that sustained attention, selective attention, and attentional control are not directly
measured by WISC-III prorated IQ or the vocabulary, similarities, block design, or object
assembly subtests. These studies support the investigation of EF, Gf-Gc cognitive
components, and attention as separate constructs.
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2.3.1.

Andrewes’ Theory of Executive Attention

Andrewes (2001) explains four systems of attention: the arousal system, orienting
system, perceptual system, and executive attention system (Posner & Peterson, 1990).
Each of these four systems is responsible for different functions related to attention. The
arousal system is broken down into two types: tonic arousal and phasic arousal. Arousal
is directly influenced by the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) with sensory
information being passed through the thalamus. The thalamus is responsible for
regulation of sensory information available to brain systems (Andrewes, 2001).
Tonic arousal refers to arousal involved in the daily cycles of sleep and
wakefulness, and the ability to be awakened and maintain wakefulness (Andrewes, 2001;
Stuss & Benson, 1984). Tonic arousal is influenced by the suprachiasmic nucleus (SCN).
The SCN is situated above the optic chiasm with neuronal projections stemming from the
optic nerve. The SCN has access to information regarding environmental light. The SCN
has a direct role in regulating circadian rhythm, and thus the varying levels of arousal
throughout the day (Andrewes, 2001). Severe pathology of tonic arousal is akinetic
mutism. This disorder is characterized by an intact sleep-wake cycle, but little cognitive
function (Stuss & Benson, 1984). The other end of the spectrum describes “drifting
attention”. In this case, attention can be given to a stimulus, but is quickly reverted back
to a lethargic or sleepy state (Stuss & Benson, 1984).
Phasic arousal is considered more variable than tonic arousal because it is
determined by environmental events (Stuss & Benson, 1984). “Fight or flight” is a
metaphor used to describe the physiological attention response to dangerous
environmental stimuli. Phasic arousal is affected by hypothalamic influence. The
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hypothalamus is responsible for the mediation of emotion and drive, or hunger, in
relation to environmental events. When dangerous stimuli are identified, one becomes
alerted by hormones released through the adrenal glands, or ARAS. A disorder in which
tonic arousal is intact, but thalamic (phasic) functions are deficient is characterized by
alertness and cooperation with an inability to suppress external stimuli (Stuss & Benson,
1984). In this case, external stimuli are easily distracting.
The orienting reflex response is the attentional component of phasic arousal. This
is seen as simply changing attention to a stimulus of appeal. The orienting reflex is in
response to novel stimuli (Andrewes, 2001). It is a curiosity for unfamiliar events or
objects. The reflexive structured control of eye movements in response to stimuli is
accounted for by the orienting system. Eye movements are oriented to stimuli via a
pathway involving the superior colliculus (SC). The SC acts as a mediator of sensory
information, sensory eye fields, motor systems, executive control, and the eye in order to
orient attention to a specific novel stimulus (Andrewes, 2001). Habituation occurs when a
stimulus is no longer novel, and doesn’t elicit the orienting reflex.
The perceptual attention system is responsible for selective attention based on
preferential concentration to stimuli of relative importance (Andrewes, 2001). A common
example of the function of this system is the cocktail party phenomenon. If a person is at
a cocktail party and they are engrossed in a conversation that demands their attention,
then they may not hear a person across the room calling their name. If that same person is
involved in a boring or uninteresting conversation, their name or other words of interest
spoken across the room may get their attention. The perceptual attention system allows a
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person to perceive important stimuli despite attending to something else (Andrewes,
2001).
Andrewes (2001) describes the executive attention system as having specific
control of the inhibition of the reflexive orienting response. Forms of attention mediated
by the executive attention system include focused attention, sustained attention, divided
attention, and attention shifting. Focus involves capacity for attention and the ability to
attend selectively to stimuli. Sustained attention specifically involves vigilance to task.
Sustaining attention and remaining alert affect the ability to complete a task effectively.
Divided attention refers to the simultaneous use of information, which allows for the
manipulation and integration of multiple sets of stimuli. Attention shifting involves the
cognitive control of the attentional system. Divided attention is most affected by acute
frontal lobe injury or diffuse brain injury affecting the frontal-brainstem control pathway
(Stuss & Gow, 1992). Cognitive flexibility allows attention to be shifted between sets
based on feedback or changing classification requirements (Andrewes, 2001).
The Andrewes (2001) model of attention follows true to cognitive processing
theory. Each attention component functions in an interdependent relationship of causeeffect-modulation. For example, sustained attention is a task associated with the
executive attention system. However, the processing of the attention system (Das,
Naglieri, Kirby, 1994) indicates that for the proper execution of sustained attention the
arousing, orientating, and perceptive systems must function properly. Cognitive
processing and the hierarchical model of cognition are common themes in this research.
Andrewes (2001) supported this process approach through evidence of the cause-effectmediation relationship of attention.
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2.3.2.

Posner and Peterson Three Factor Theory of Attention

In a seminal work on the attention system, Posner and Peterson (1990) delineated
three basic characteristics of human attention. First, the attention system can be
identified as separate from other cognitive systems in the brain. Second, attention
functions within a network, as opposed to a single center or a general brain function.
Third, within the attention system, different regions perform different functions. Posner
and Peterson (1990) explain the three functions as orientation, signal detection, and
vigilance.
In a contemporary examination of attention in children, Manly et al. (2001)
provided support for Posner and Peterson’s (1990) explanation of three functions within
the attention system. Manly et al. (2001) applied the Structural Equation Modeling
(SEM) approach to data from a child sample that was given a contemporary attention
battery (Test of Everyday Attention for Children) executive functioning measures, and a
measure of cognitive ability. The SEM indicated the best fit for a model of attention in
children including selective attention, attentional control/switching, and sustained
attention. In addition to Manly et al. (2001) providing support for Posner and Peterson’s
(1990) three separate attention functions, the nonsignificant relationships they found
between attention factors and other cognitive tasks provide support for attention
components as additional skills separate from typical Gf-Gc cognitive components.
2.3.3.

Norman and Shallice Theory of Attention

Norman and Shallice (1986) explain the difference between routine behavior and
behavior requiring executive involvement. Routine behavior involves three steps: sensory
activation of schemas; the selection of appropriate, or “best match”, schemas given the
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stimuli; and ending with the execution of a behavior program. The Norman and Shallice
(1986) model is investigated to provide a basis for the fractionation of attention and EF.
Routine behavior is considered automatic and not in need of executive
involvement. Behavior can be considered automatic following a number of different
criteria. Hasher and Zacks (1984) list six criteria for automaticity: encoding without
deliberate effort; incidental encoding; no effects of training or practice; small individual
differences; small to no age differences between children, adults, and elderly; and
information is not disrupted by simultaneous attention-demanding tasks. The model of
behavioral control (Norman & Shallice, 1986) involves the use of a contention scheduler
to associate stimuli with appropriate schemas.
The Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) explains the function of the control of
cognitive functions in order to navigate a new task. If the contention scheduler cannot
find a preexisting schema, there is more than one appropriate schema available, the
strongest schema is inappropriate given the situation, or the consequences of a wrong
schema selection are dangerous, then the SAS becomes involved to adapt and integrate
components of previously learned information and the novel task (Norman & Shallice,
1986).
The explanation of the executive attentional system bares resemblance to the
Norman and Shallice (1986) model of executive functioning. The executive attentional
system allocates resources to specific functions depending on the need of an organism.
The SAS defines it as non-automatic behavior, but this can be translated into behavior
that is novel or requires additional cognitive resources. The SAS model provides support
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for the disconnection of EF and attention, and further explains the executive modulation
of attention.
2.4

Executive Memory (Working Memory)
The cognitive component of memory is inclusive of sensory, working, and long

term memory. Executive functions serve as a modulator between the three types of
memory, but neither is independent of the other three. A model of multiple theoretical
views describes working memory as a function of the phonological loop (composed of
the phonological store and articulatory loop), central executive, visuo-spatial sketchpad
(composed of the visual cache and inner scribe), and episodic long term memory buffer
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2003). The central executive in this model refers to
executive modulation of attention (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994) and accounts for the
“working” component of working memory.
A comparison has been made between the current working memory model and
multi-component cognitive Gf-Gc theory (Baddeley, 2003). An individual’s episodic
long-term memory, acquired language, and visual semantics account for crystallized
skills that are referenced to provide the foundation for novel problem solving. The visuospatial sketchpad, episodic buffer, and phonological loop are fluid systems of Gf related
abilities. The central executive is a separate regulatory system that controls cognition and
behavior based non-automatic cognitions or behaviors (Baddeley, 2003).
Baddeley (2003) makes the comparison of Gf-Gc with the fluid and crystallized
systems of working memory, with central executive functions apparent as a separate
collaboration. The correlation of working memory and Gf-Gc components is clear, with
executive functioning as a separate additional component (Baddeley, 2003). Additionally,
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Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, and Adams (2005) found that working memory shares more
variance with learning and memory than with executive functions. This study provided
support for the separation of executive functions and working memory. A comprehensive
psychometric analysis, which includes the neuroanatomical executive functioning
components as separate skills from the basic Gf-Gc broad domains, provides productive
foundation for the relationship between cognition and the hierarchy of executive
functions (Baddeley, 2003).
2.4.1.

Theories of Working Memory

Baddeley and Hitch (1974) pioneered a model of working memory in terms of the
central executive modulation and integration of various slave systems. The model of
working memory has undergone significant development since Baddeley and Hitch
proposed the model of central executive modulation of various slave systems and long
term memory in 1974. The slave systems involved in working memory are the visuospatial scratch pad and the phonological loop. The phonological loop is responsible for
processing auditory information and maintaining it to allow for mental manipulation. The
visuo-spatial is comparably responsible for visual and nonverbal information. Each of
these systems is dependent on a person’s memory capacity. As information/data is being
maintained in each of these slave systems, the central executive coordinates the processes
of integrating and correlating the information with episodic long-term memory and
regulates attention resources (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Components of information
being addressed in working memory require continued reference to the long term
memory, and the episodic buffer performs this task.
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A progressive model of working memory breaks the phonological loop into
phonological store and articulatory loop. The phonological store accounts for auditory
memory span, and the articulatory loop controls the rehearsal and maintenance of the
memory. This model also breaks the visuo-spatial sketchpad into the visual cache and
inner scribe. The visual cache controls the passive storage of visual memories, and the
inner scribe is an active system that controls a person’s memories for spatial positioning
and movements. The central executive in this model is responsible for the allocation of
resources/attention (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994) to each of these slave systems and the
meditation of stimuli with visual and language episodic long-term memory.
The exact definition of executive functioning is a somewhat elusive topic. The
debate is partially due to the poly-connectivity of brain systems and the possible
directionality of control. Many brain systems are dependent or related in function to each
other. It is because of this interdependent relationship that the pathway of control has not
been solidified.
2.5.

Development of Executive Functioning in Children
Children experience three major “growth spurts” in executive function between

the ages of 0-5 years, 7-9 years, and 11-13 years (Anderson, 2002). Children as young as
12 months exhibit goal directed problem solving behavior, and as young as 18 months
exhibit self control to maintain an action or inhibit a behavior (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, &
Kenworthy, 2000). Skills emerging from 0-5 years may include the ability to inhibit
certain behaviors and shift to a new response, the ability to voluntarily modulate attention
(Luria, 1973), the ability to inhibit instinct behaviors (Klenberg, Korkman, & LahtiNuuttila, 2001), the emergence of simple advanced planning skills, the emergence of
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simple conceptual reasoning and generation of new concepts, the ability to rapidly switch
between simple response sets, and an increase in response speed and verbal fluency
(Anderson, 2002). Motor inhibition and impulse control are seen as the skills first fully
developed, approximately by age 6 years (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001).
Although attentional control begins to develop around 2 years of age, a child’s
behavior continues to be highly perseverative until the third and fourth years of age
(Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Also between 3 and 4 years old, the accuracy of a child’s
responses to tasks that require inhibition of a prepotent response increases dramatically
(Posner & Rothbart, 1998), with continued improvement of inhibition into adulthood
(Durston, Thomas, Yang, Ulug, Zimmerman, & Casey, 2002). This increase in accuracy
for selective inhibition tasks marks the development of effortful control in children
(Eisenberg et. al., 2004; Posner & Rothbart, 1998).
While younger children can make decisions, their decisions tend to require more
time and are not as sophisticated as those made by older children and adolescents. Also, a
child begins to acquire the ability to learn from their mistakes and develop alternate
strategies, with mastery of this skill by 8 years of age (Anderson, 2002). Children as
young as 8 years old can perform tasks of frontal lobe functioning at some level (Davies
& Rose, 1999).
Between the ages of 7 to 9 years children increase their ability to deal with multidimensional switching tasks, planning and organization skills rapidly develop (between 7
and 10 years), and strategic and reasoning behaviors become more efficient (between 7
and 11 years). A significant burst in processing speed also becomes apparent from
approximately 9 years until 10 years old (Anderson, 2002).
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During the development from 11 until 12 years old, a child’s processing speed
experiences another significant increase. Also at this time, self-regulation and strategic
decision making abilities change. There can be seen a regression from the use of
conceptual strategies to utilization of more conservative and cautious “piecemeal”
approaches. A child’s information processing, cognitive flexibility, and goal setting are
basically mature by 12 years old. Also, at 12 years the neuroelectric activity in the
dorsolateral prefrontal area is fully mature (Davies & Rose, 1999). A person’s EF
development does not end with the critical period of 13 years old, but continues to
emerge the refinement of strategies, improved decision-making, increased efficiency and
fluency (Anderson, 2002), and concept formation (Wang, 1987).
It has been suggested that a person’s frontal lobe develops on a different timeline
than other brain regions. Davies and Rose (1999) found that versus parietal lobe
development, cognitive performance skills that are dependent on frontal lobe activity take
longer and are more significant when they develop. As can be noted from the
developmental progress of executive functions, EF develops in spurts rather than a linear
progression (Anderson, 2002; Gnys & Willis, 1991).
Anderson et al. (2001) studied the development of executive functions in
adolescence. They employed neuropsychological tests of several EF sub-domains in
order to determine developmental progression of these skills. This study assumed
attentional control, cognitive flexibility, and goal setting as separate components of EF.
The developmental progression of EF skills is relatively flat during this time, as
compared to the significant spikes or spurts (Anderson, 2002) evident during early and
middle childhood. Attentional control undergoes another significant increase around 15
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years of age, accounting for an increase in attentional capacity and processing speed
(Anderson et al., 2001). This study found that cognitive flexibility is likely already
mature by the time a child reaches adolescence. They found no significant increases in
this EF component during adolescence. Goal setting, which subsumes initiating,
planning, problem solving, and strategic behaviors, steadily improves until 12 years of
age and is likely fully developed by this time. Despite improvements in attentional
control and planning, adolescence does not offer hallmark changes in EF (Anderson et
al., 2001).
Wang (1987) describes concept formation as “last to appear, first to disappear”
(pg 10). He explains that concept formation begins to develop in puberty and continues
throughout adulthood. Concept formation progressively matures through most of
adulthood, but may begin to show decline as early as 40 years of age (Wang, 1987).
2.6.

Biological Basis of Executive Functioning
Structural damage to the dorsolateral frontal lobe regions of the brain has been

implicated in executive functioning deficits. This brain region has been implicated in
mediating executive functions in children as young as 8 years old. Children with damage
to the dorsolateral frontal region have demonstrated more EF impairment than did
children with damage to either the medial or orbital frontal regions (Filley et al., 1999).
However, the frontal connectivity to other brain systems is well documented (Stuss &
Benson, 1984), and these systems are thereby regulated by a person’s executive
functions. The pathways between these systems, or the systems of interest, are also
implicated in executive functioning deficits (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000).
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Goldman-Rakic (1987) explained that a possible reason why children experience
continued improvement in their cognitive abilities, into adulthood, may be because of the
elimination of synapses, continued myelin formation, changes in the regulation of
neurotransmitter receptor synthesis and maintenance, and modification in the
biosynthesis of neurotransmitters and peptides. Davies and Rose (1999) attributed frontal
lobe development to progressive maturational stages. In an analysis of variance for
performance on tasks measuring frontal lobe (executive) functions versus tasks associated
with parietal functions, Davies and Rose (1991) determined that performance on
neuropsychological tasks of frontal lobe function showed more significant increases as a
child progressed through maturational stages, than did performance on tasks associated
with parietal lobe functioning.
Goldberg, Podell, and Lovell (1994) caution against the interpretation of lateral
executive functions as verbal versus nonverbal. They describe the novelty-routinization
approach as the differential between left and right frontal lobe functions. The right frontal
cortex is responsible for the processing of novel or unfamiliar cognitive demands. They
describe the left frontal cortex as involves the processing of routine or preexisting
knowledge (Goldberg, Podell, & Lovell, 1994). This theory breaks down the verbal –
nonverbal barrier in that it assumes right hemispheric involvement in the acquisition of
language, a novel task in young children. Similarly, contemporary research describes plan
generation as a right prefrontal function, while plan execution is largely a left prefrontal
task (Newman et al., 2003).
Rosenweig, Breedlove, and Leiman (2002) describe dysexecutive, disinhibited,
and apathetic type syndromes associated with prefrontal cortex injury. Dysexecutive type
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syndrome, associated with the dorsolateral region of the brain, results in diminished
judgment, planning, insight, and temporal organization; cognitive impersistence; motor
programming deficits; and diminished self care. A person with a disinhibited type
syndrome, which is associated with dysfunction of the orbitofrontal region, may exhibit
stimulus driven behavior, diminished social insight, and emotional lability. Finally, the
apathetic type syndrome, resulting from damage to the mediofrontal region, includes
diminished spontaneity, diminished verbal output, diminished motor behavior, urinary
incontinence, lower extremity weakness and sensory loss, diminished spontaneous
prosody, and increase response latency.
The dorsolateral region is responsible for the cognitive aspects of executive
functioning. While the orbital and medial areas are related to the behavioral
manifestations of executive function (Anderson, 2002).
One of the most visible systems affected by the frontal lobe executive control is
the motor system. Deficits are apparent in following significant damage to the prefrontal
convexity and orbital areas of the prefrontal lobes. Prefrontal convexity damage,
otherwise known as hypokinesis, results in retarded motor movement that seems to lack
initiative. Orbital damage, otherwise known as hyperkinesis, results in impulsivity and
restlessness that may present itself as an inability to sit still and make effective motor
movements (Stuss & Benson, 1984).
Luria (1973) also described motor deficits in terms of lesions localized to premotor areas, and massive damage to or pathology of the frontal motor areas. Pre-motor
region damage/pathology results in an inability to stop the successive repetition of a
motor action. This action is seen as a compulsive repetition of preinitiated actions (Stuss
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& Benson, 1984). Pre-motor functions differ slightly from frontal motor functions, in that
frontal motor damage can result in repetition of a motor action in the presence of
different instructions (Stuss & Benson, 1984).
Another role Stuss and Benson (1984) explain as controlled by the frontal lobes is
sensory-perceptual function. Unilateral sensory neglect and unilateral inattention
phenomenon are characteristic of frontal lobe lesions. Unilateral sensory neglect is
characterized by an inability to attend to a sensory field with damage to the opposite
frontal lobe. This inability follows a spectrum of severity and can range from minimal
neglect to severe sensory defect (Stuss & Benson, 1984). Unilateral inattention
phenomenon is described as the inability to report bilateral stimuli in spite of being able
to report separate unilateral stimuli in both visual fields (Stuss & Benson, 1984).
Subcortical structures for circuitry pathways in people with Huntington’s and
Parkinson’s disease have been identified. Both disorders have significant executive
dysfunction sequelae, and it is important to acknowledge these syndromes to form an
understanding of EF. The first circuit is described as the Dorsolateral Circuit and is
responsible for executive dysfunction in Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disorders. The
circuit is as follows: convexity of the frontal lobe, dorsolateral head of the caudate
nucleus, globus pallidus and substantia nigra, and then medial dorsal thalamic nuclei and
ventral anterior. This pathway then circles back to the convexity of the frontal lobe
(Andrewes, 2001; adapted from Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings
and Coffey, 2000).
The second circuit, named the orbitofrontal circuit, is responsible for emotional
and social dysfunction in these disorders. The circuit begins with the inferior lateral
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prefrontal cortex, then the inferior caudate nucleus, the pallidum and substantia nigra, and
finally the medial portions of the ventral anterior and medial dorsal thalamic nuclei,
before returning to the inferior lateral prefrontal cortex (Andrewes, 2001; adapted from
Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings and Coffey, 2000).
The final circuit, anterior cingulated circuit, is responsible for akinetic mutism,
apathy, lack of drive and focus of attention. This circuit begins in the cortex of the
anterior cingulated gyrus (Brodmann’s area 24), then to the ventral or limbic striatum,
nucleus accumbens, ventomedial portions of the caudate and putamen, and finally the
medial thalamic nuclei before returning to the cortex of the anterior cingulated gyrus
(Andrewes, 2001; adapted from Alexander, Crutcher and Delong, 1990 and Cummings
and Coffey, 2000).
2.7.

Executive Functioning as it Relates to Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
The DSM-IV-TR (2001) defines Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder

(ADHD) as a childhood disorder that may include inattention, impulsive behavior, and/or
hyperactive behavior. ADHD is broken down into three subtypes by the DSM: ADHD,
Combined Type; ADHD, Predominantly Inattentive Type; and ADHD, Predominantly
Hyperactive-Impulsive Type. ADHD is a behavioral disorder characterized by specific
observable behavioral and social deficits. Even though ADHD is diagnosed through
observable behaviors, specific cognitive deficits are hallmark.
Barkley (1999), a key researcher in the area of childhood ADHD, explains that
children with ADHD exhibit a deficient ability to inhibit responses. Response inhibition
involves three processes: inhibition of initial response prior to the event, stopping an
ongoing response during an event, or controlling interference during an event to ensure
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proper completion. Excessive activity level, or hyperactivity, is due to a child’s
impulsiveness or inability to inhibit motor action (Barkley, 1999). Children with ADHD
have significant trouble conforming to behavioral restriction despite specific instructions
from their environment (Barkley, 1999). Inhibitory defect can also be seen as an inability
to delay gratification, and an inability to resist temptations (Barkley, 1999).
Children with ADHD have demonstrated significantly lower performance on the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency (F-A-S, animals, and fruits) and Picture
Arrangement (WISC-R), which supports the theory that children with ADHD have
deficits in executive functioning (Chelune & Baer, 1986; Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli,
Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998). Children with ADHD have deficient performance
on both the phonetic and categorical sections of verbal fluency tests, but they tend to
display more significant deficit on the phonetic section (Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli,
Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998).
Children with ADHD perform significantly worse than non-ADHD children on
measures of executive function such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, tests of Verbal
Fluency, and the Picture Arrangement subtest of the Wechsler series of intelligence tests.
This supports the idea that children with ADHD display executive dysfunction (Pineda,
Ardila, Rosselli, Cadavid, Mancheno, & Mejia, 1998).
Children with ADHD have significantly more difficulty on cognitive tasks of
flexibility and abstract categorization than do children without ADHD. Also, children
with ADHD tend to make errors on tasks, such as Picture Arrangement, that are common
in persons with frontal lobe damage (Pineda, Ardila, Rosselli, Cadavid, Mancheno, &
Mejia, 1998).
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ADHD has characteristics similar to prefrontal injury (Benton, 1991).
Specifically, ADHD and hyperactivity involve dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex
(Benton, 1991). A difference exists between prefrontal injury and ADHD in the
functioning of visuo-perceptive and visuo-analytic capacity. These skills are largely
intact with prefrontal injury, but can be dysfunctional in children with ADHD (Benton,
1991).
2.8.

Executive Functioning Conclusion
In order to complete a proper analysis of the complex nature of EF, time must be

spent describing its component parts, development, and biological causation. Through
investigation of the neuroanatomical perspective of EF, several key components were
identified: control, cognitive flexibility, problem solving, and personality characteristics
such as drive, social skills, and insight. These components comprehensively explain the
specific executive functions that are not directly related to the executive modulation of
other brain systems.
Some contemporary theories of executive functioning include components that
are dependent on the proper execution of other systems or skills. For example, the
execution of attention and working memory is dependent on the proper functioning of
several brain systems. Attention requires a person to have intact arousal system, orienting
system, perceptual system, and executive attention system. Dysfunction in any one
system will cause a person to experience symptoms of inattention. As well, working
memory is dependent on the functioning phonological loop (composed of the
phonological store and articulatory loop), central executive, visuo-spatial sketchpad
(composed of the visual cache and inner scribe), and episodic long term memory buffer
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(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). As is the case with attention, dysfunction with any one
component will affect a person’s working memory ability.
The basic concept of EF development in humans explains the theory of
hierarchical executive skill development. The first executive skill to develop in children
is the ability to control impulses and motor movements (Klenberg, Korkman, & LahtiNuuttila, 2001). This control skill sets the groundwork for what proves to be a
hierarchical processing order of executive functions. As control is the first to develop,
some of the last EF skills mastered include planning, goal setting, concept formation, and
judgment. Those skills that are the most complex and difficult to master prove to be those
that are most severely affected by dysfunction at the lower levels of the hierarchy.
In conclusion to this executive functioning concept and research synthesis, EF
assessment measures can prove to be useful tools for the understanding of what
constitutes executive ability. The D-KEFS is an example of a contemporary assessment
battery that employs a processing approach to EF, and attempts to account for all of the
contributing factors to successful executive functioning. It breaks down the necessary
skills for successful completion of a task and separates EF from brain systems that
contribute to task completion. This process allows researchers and clinicians to remove
the contribution that non-EF skills have on the EF performance. The result is a purer
understanding of how executive abilities and other related systems contribute to a
person’s functioning levels across domains.
2.9.

Cattell-Horn-Carroll Model of Cognitive Ability
According to McGrew (2003) the working definition of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll

(CHC) theory of cognition categorizes abilities into 16 separate domains of functioning,
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called the Broad (stratum II) definitions. These broad definitions are further broken down
into Narrow (stratum I) definitions that account for comprehensive investigations of the
factors that are included in stratum II domains.
Fluid Intelligence/Reasoning (Gf) describes the ability to solve novel or nonmastered problems (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998). The skills necessary
for fluid reasoning often include processes such as problem solving, concept formation,
and classification. Measured factors that load on this subcategory include general
sequential reasoning, induction, quantitative reasoning, Piagetian reasoning, and speed of
reasoning (McGrew, 2003).
Crystallized Intelligence/Knowledge (Gc) describes a person’s acquired
knowledge of the language and specific nuances of culture, and/or the application of this
knowledge (McGrew, 2003). Gc is the store of verbal declarative and procedural
knowledge. Variance contributing to Gc includes language development, lexical
knowledge, listening ability, general information, information about culture,
communication ability, oral production and fluency, grammatical sensitivity, foreign
language proficiency, and foreign language aptitude (McGrew, 2003; McGrew &
Flanagan, 1998).
General (or domain-specific) Knowledge (Gkn) describes the extent of a person’s
acquired knowledge in specialized domains (McGrew, 2003). Gkn typically does not
represent experiences of a person’s particular culture. Factors such as knowledge of
English as a second language, knowledge of signing, skill in lip reading, geography
achievement, general science information, mechanical knowledge, and knowledge of
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behavioral content are measures of the variance in Gkn (McGrew, 2003; McGrew &
Flanagan, 1998).
Visual Spatial Abilities (Gv) describes the set of abilities that accounts for the
different processes involved in the generation, storage, retrieval and transformation of
visual stimuli. Gv tasks require the accurate perception and mental transformation of
spatial orientation tasks. Measures that make up Gv include visualization, spatial
relations, closure speed, flexibility of closure, visual memory, spatial scanning, serial
perceptual integration, length estimation, perceptual illusions, perceptual alternations, and
imagery.
Ga is the acronym for auditory processing. This subcategory explains an
individual’s ability to control the perception of auditory information (McGrew, 2003). It
involves a variety of abilities necessary for the discrimination of sound, and the analysis,
manipulation, comprehension, and synthesis of sound. Phonetic coding, speech sound
discrimination, resistance to auditory stimulus distortion, memory for sound patterns,
general sound discrimination, temporal tracking, musical discrimination and judgment,
maintaining and judging rhythm, sound-intensity/duration discrimination, soundfrequency discrimination, hearing and speech threshold factors, absolute pitch, and sound
localization are all factors included in Ga (McGrew, 2003).
Gsm, short-term memory, describes the ability to capture and maintain stimuli
from the immediate situation (McGrew, 2003). CHC theorists (McGrew, 2003) generally
explain Immediate as recall within one minute of exposure to stimulus. Memory span and
working memory are included as factors of Gsm. Working memory is maintained in this
interpretation of CHC theory despite being driven by theoretical development and not as
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an individual differences factor (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998). This is explained further in
the section describing the theories of working memory.
Long-term storage and retrieval (Glr) describes the ability to encode information
with fluent post retrieval of the information. Two major types of Glr include the ability to
fluently retrieve information from long term storage over minutes or hours, which
McGrew (2003) describes as intermediate memory, and fluency of retrieval with days,
months, or years since encoding. A correlation has also been drawn between the Gf-Gc
concept of Glr and the long-term memory buffer explained in Baddeley and Hitch’s
(1974) theory of working memory (McGrew & Flanagen, 1998). Glr differentiates
between the ability to retrieve stored facts, reproductive process, and the ability to
produce material from previously learned rules or information. Glr includes twelve
narrow factor definitions. Included are the ability to associate pairs of information,
rapidly and fluently produce words based on phonemic or categorical clue (McGrew &
Flanagan, 1998), and the ability to draw figures based on visual stimulus rapidly and
fluently. Glr does not dissociate between verbal and nonverbal tasks, but accounts for the
appropriate consolidation of information and accurate manipulation of memory.
Cognitive processing speed (Gs) refers to the speed with which one can accurately
perform tasks that are considered relatively routine or automatic. The Gs narrow
definition includes speed of reading and writing, the speed with which one can take a test
of routine tasks, visual perceptual and scanning speed, and the speed of accurate
performance of basic numerical operations.
McGrew (2003) also describes the time needed to make a decision as a broad
categorical definition (Gt). On a basic level Gt is the ability to make decisions quickly
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given simple stimuli (McGrew, 2003). Gt is explained by reaction to a single stimuli, the
choice between two or more alternative stimuli, the processing of a decision that requires
mental manipulation or comparison of characteristics, and the time it takes to identify
changes or characteristics of stimuli based on limited exposure to that stimuli.
Rapid and fluent motor movements that are independent of cognitive control (Gps)
are accounted for by the CHC theory. A typical Gps task involves goal directed hand,
finger, or leg movements in the presence of a speed requirement.
Quantitative knowledge (Gq) accounts for the breadth and depth of learned
quantitative knowledge (McGrew, 2003). Mathematical knowledge involves the storage
of declarative and procedural math facts. Math facts are generally measured on tests of
math achievement.
Similar to Gq, Reading and writing (Grw) also accounts for the breadth and depth
of declarative and procedural knowledge. Grw describes reading and writing skills in
terms of reading decoding, reading comprehension, verbal language comprehension,
cloze ability, spelling ability, writing ability, English usage knowledge, and speeded
reading and writing fluency. Reading speed is also loads on Gs, and writing speed on Gs
and Gps. Gq and Grw reflect the integration of achievement into the Gf-Gc theory (McGrew
& Flanagan, 1998).
The final broad stratum II definition is psychomotor ability (Gp). Gp is the ability
to perform motor movements with precision, coordination, or strength (McGrew, 2003).
Measures that load on this domain include static strength, multilimb coordination, finger
and manual dexterity, arm-hand steadiness, control precision, aiming, and gross body
equilibrium.
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Olfactory abilities (Go), Tactile abilities (Gh), and Kinesthetic abilities (Gk) are
included in McGrew’s (2003) working definition of the CHC model of cognitive ability,
but they have not as of yet been thoroughly investigated. Go refers to abilities that depend
on olfactory sensory receptors. Each category describes sensory sensitivity in each area,
with the inclusion of olfactory memory.
Table 2.1
Table of stratum I and II abilities incorporated in the CHC expansion of the Gf-Gc
cognitive model. All sixteen stratum II abilities are subsumed under one stratum I ability,
labeled as “g” (adapted from McGrew, 2003).
Stratum II
Fluid Intelligence (Gf)

Crystallized Intelligence (Gc)

General Knowledge (Gkn)

Visual Spatial Abilities (Gv)

Stratum III
General Sequential Reasoning
Induction
Quantitative Reasoning
Piagetian Reasoning
Speed of Reasoning
Language Development
Lexical Knowledge
Listening Ability
General Information
Information about Culture
Communication Ability
Oral Production and Fluency
Grammatical Sensitivity
Foreign Language Proficiency
Foreign Language Aptitude
Knowledge of English as a second language
Knowledge of signing
Skill in Lip-reading
Geography Achievement
General Science Information
Mechanical Knowledge
Knowledge of Behavioral Content
Visualization
Spatial Relations
Closure Speed
Flexibility of Closure
Visual Memory
Spatial Scanning
Serial Perceptual Integration
Length Estimation
Perceptual Illusions
Perceptual Alternations
Imagery
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Auditory Processing (Ga)

Short-term Memory (Gsm)

Long-term Storage and Retrieval (Glr)

Cognitive Processing Speed (Gs)

Decision/Reaction Time or Speed (Gt)

Psychomotor Speed (Gps)
Quantitative Knowledge (Gq)

Reading/Writing (Grw)

Psychomotor Abilities (Gp)

Phonetic Coding
Speech Sound Discrimination
Resistance to Auditory Stimulus Distortion
Memory for Sound Patterns
General Sound Discrimination
Temporal Tracking
Musical Discrimination and Judgment
Maintaining and Judging Rhythm
Sound-Intensity/Duration Discrimination
Sound-Frequency Discrimination
Hearing and Speech Threshold Factors
Absolute Pitch
Sound Localization
Memory Span
Working Memory
Associative Memory
Meaningful Memory
Free Recall Memory
Ideational Fluency
Associational Fluency
Expressional Fluency
Naming Facility
Word Fluency
Figural Fluency
Figural Flexibility
Sensitivity to Problems
Originality/Creativity
Learning Abilities
Perceptual Speed
Rate of Test Taking
Number Facility
Speed of Reasoning
Reading Speed-fluency
Writing Speed-fluency
Simple Reaction Time
Choice Reaction Time
Semantic Processing Speed
Mental Comparison Speed
Inspection Time
Speed of Limb Movement
Writing Speed-fluency
Speed of Articulation
Movement Time
Mathematical Knowledge
Mathematical Achievement
Reading Decoding
Reading Comprehension
Verbal-printed Language Comprehension
Cloze Ability
Spelling Ability
Writing Ability
English Usage Knowledge
Reading Speed-fluency
Writing Speed-fluency
Static Strength
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Olfactory Abilities (Go)
Tactile Abilities (Gh)
Kinesthetic Abilities (Gk)

2.10.

Multilimb Coordination
Finger Dexterity
Manual Dexterity
Arm-hand Steadiness
Control Precision
Aiming
Gross Body Equilibrium
Olfactory Memory
Olfactory Sensitivity
Tactile Sensitivity
Kinesthetic Sensitivity

The Development of the CHC Model of Cognitive Ability
The CHC model underwent major developments during throughout its history

leading to the contemporary version. A continuum of progress proposing significant
theoretical, measurement and assessment developments is suggested by McGrew (2004).
The development of the CHC model began with Spearman’s g/s factor theory.
Spearman’s two-factor theory poses a correlation between general intelligence (g) and
specific factors (s). These two factors were thought to explain for the relationship
between measures of sensory discrimination. It is fitting that the roots of a theory based
on factor analysis begin with the g/s factor theory, because Spearman has been credited
for introducing factor analysis to cognitive theory.
The British Tradition began by analyzing the g-factor and then grouping smaller
factors based on breadth. This theory posed a hierarchical theory of g and its “subfactors”
(McGrew, 2003). It suggested that most of the variance of intelligence was made up of g
and to a lesser extent the small group factors.
The American Tradition does not readily identify a g-factor. This led to the
formation of second order factors. Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) theory
(1938) separated seven to nine abilities that were essentially independent of the factor g.
This was the beginning of the differentiation between fluid (Gf) and Crystallized (Gc)
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intelligence. Factor analysis of the first order definitions led to second order definitions
explaining Gf and Gc. After this development, the WERCOF abilities were recognized,
which suggested 60 possible cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2003).
Following early development of psychometric theory, specific research on the GfGc theory provided an extension to the existing factors. Additional broad G-factors were
included in the model. They were Gv (visuo-spatial abilities), Gsm (short-term memory),
Glr (long-term storage and retrieval), and Gs (cognitive processing speed). The additional
G-factors were supported by factor analytic, developmental, genetic, neurocognitive, and
outcome-criterion evidence research (McGrew, 2003). There was additional support for
eight broad abilities and a hierarchical structural model of intelligence (Gustafasson,
1984). At the time that research was supporting the existence of these additional factors,
there was no test battery that reflected the theory. This disparity is referred to as a theoryto-applied measurement practice gap. The hierarchical framework was based on the
suggestions that Gf was equivalent to “g”, which essentially placed Gf at the top of the
pyramid.
The WJ-R battery (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989) was the first clinical assessment
of cognitive ability that was based on the Gf-Gc theory. This assessment specifically
aimed at closing the theory-to-applied measurement practice gap. Through factor analysis
of the WJ battery, independent researchers (Horn, Carroll, Woodcock, and McGrew)
design the WJ-R, which measures nine broad abilities.
Following this major advancement in the assessment of cognitive ability, other
well known intelligence batteries (DAS, DTLA-3, KABC, SB-IV, and WISC-
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R/WAIS/WAIS-R) were classified at the broad Gf-Gc level. This cross-battery assessment
further verified the construct evidence for the Gf-Gc theory.
Carroll’s (1993) three tier hierarchical model of cognitive ability included an
overarching g-factor, which was defined by breadth of generality. The developing model
of ability included narrow, broad, and general levels. To this point Cattell and Horn’s
model differed from Carroll with respect to the presence of a g-factor. Empirical evidence
from the use of WJ-R norm data supported the existence of Carroll’s three levels of
ability, and also the presence of intermediate abilities, which exist between the three
levels.
Emerging empirical data lead to a merging of the theories and the classification of
intelligence batteries into narrow and broad ability levels. It sparked investigations into
the definitions of broad and narrow abilities. A formalized cross battery confirmatory
factor analytic (CFA) approach was applied to major intelligence assessments for
classification of abilities (Phelps, McGrew, Knopik, & Ford, 2005). The Phelps et al.
(2005) CFA used the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition (WISC-III)
and the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Abilities, 3rd edition (WJ-III) to confirm
Gf-Gc broad domains and narrow abilities. The WISC-III and WJ-III load heavily on five
stratum II domains (Gc, Gq, Gs, Gsm, Gv), and additionally the Ga, Gf, and Glr domains
load only on the WJ-III assessment. Phelps et al. (2005) indicates that the fourth edition
of the Wechsler intelligence series (WISC-IV; PsychCorp, 2004) may represent the
addition of Gf, Ga, and Glr domains.
As the investigations of this theory continue, empirical evidence validates the
broad abilities Gf, Gc, Gv, Gsm, Glr, Gs, Gq (quantitative knowledge), and Grw
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(reading/writing) as structural components of the CHC model. The presence of Gq and
Grw reflects the integration of achievement into this model. The continuing study of this
theory can account for the validation of the sixteen broad level abilities. As this working
model of cognitive ability continues to develop, stratum II and stratum I will continue to
be refined through empirically validated psychometric evidence. The purpose of this
research is to continue this investigation. The inclusion of executive functions and
attention is relevant to the development of CHC cognitive theory.
2.11.

Relationship between Executive Functioning and Cognitive Ability
Executive functioning, when defined as a skill describing responses to the

inhibition of confounding variables for the integration, organization, and maintenance of
attention and memory (Wecker et. al., 2000), has been linked to Global Fluid Intelligence
(Gf) (de Jong & Das-Smaal, 1995), academic achievement, a child’s placement in special
classes, a child’s need for tutoring assistance, and grade retention (Seidman et. al., 2001).
Deficits in executive functioning for children aged 8-17 years with brain lesions, as
measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), were found not to be related to
general cognitive impairment as measured by the VIQ and FSIQ (Filley et al, 1999).
However, in a population of normal children with above average to very superior IQs,
performance on the WCST was found to vary based on IQ level (Arffa, Lovell, Podell, &
Goldberg, 1998). Arffa et al. (1998) found that children with very superior IQs
outperformed peers with above average to superior IQs on the WCST. This study
suggests a link between “higher level conceptual functions” (pg. 718) in children and
measures of IQ.

53

Generally, psychometric intelligence has been found to be intact following insult
to the frontal lobes or pathology following disease (Benton, 1991). Specific skills
measured by conventional intelligence tests are not included in the deficits found in the
disabilities of frontal or pre-frontal injury (Benton, 1991). Mattson et al (1999) found that
for children with fetal alcohol exposure, there is no significant correlation between
intelligence and executive functioning; however they do note that this finding may have
been due to the small sample size of their study. Low intelligence does not account for all
of the deficit variance found in children with fetal alcohol syndrome and prenatal
exposure to alcohol, because of their deficits in executive functioning (Mattson et al,
1999).
Scores on Word Context tests have been found to be correlated with intelligence,
but deficits on Word Context measures may not be accounted for primarily by executive
dysfunction (Mattson et al, 1999).
Research involving adult neurological patients has demonstrated that people with
focal frontal lobe damage often perform normally on tests measuring IQ and other basic
skills, such as reading and spelling tests (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Tests
measuring IQ have correlations between .20 and .40 with tests of higher-level EF tests
(Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000). This means that only about 4-16% of the variance for
EF tests is accounted for by measures of IQ and basic level achievement (Delis, Kaplan,
& Kramer, 2001). Ardila, Pineda, and Rosselli (2000) found that performance on the
WCST, as a measure of concept formation and executive functions, is not highly
correlated with performance on the WISC-R. Their conclusions support the postulation
that IQ tests are not sensitive to executive control and planning. As well, Murji and
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DeLuca (1998) found that FSIQ from the WISC-III was not a factor in overall
performance on the Tower of London, as a task of planning and problem solving, for
children aged 6 to 15 years with FSIQ greater than 80.
The relationship between ADHD, IQ, and executive functions has been analyzed
by many previous studies (Barkley, 1990; Crinella & Yu, 2000; Duncan et al., 1995,
1996; Goldstein, 1987; Priftera & Dersh, 1993; Schwean, Saklofske, Yackulic, & Quinn,
1993; Swanson, 1997; Wechsler, 1991). The thought is that measures of fluid intelligence
have a higher correlation to psychometric “g” than do conventional measures of general
intelligence (Duncan et al., 1995, 1996), such as FSIQ (Wechsler, 2003) and global
composite index. Frontal lobe lesions have been found to affect a person’s executive
functions, but they may not affect fluid intelligence (Crinella & Yu, 2000). Regardless,
most tasks that measure cognitive ability require some level of executive processing or
control (Anderson, 2002).
Mahone, Hagelthorn, Cutting, Schuerholz, Pelletier, Rawlins, Singer, and Denkla
(2002) investigated the correlation of EF measures and IQ in children with and without
ADHD. Their findings suggest that children with ADHD demonstrate larger deficits on
tasks of executive functioning than do normal children when IQ is in the average range.
However, children with IQs in the high average or superior range, with/without ADHD,
could not be discerned on EF task performance alone. The authors noted that a child’s IQ
score accounted for more variance in EF than did the diagnosis of ADHD. This supports
IQ as a moderator variable for children with ADHD (Mahone et al., 2002). It also further
supports the complex interaction of executive functions and component cognitive abilities
being analyzed in this study.
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2.12.

Literature Review Conclusion
In conclusion to this literature review, it is imperative to recognize the complexity

and interrelatedness of cognitive systems. Cognitive processing theories explain the
interrelated nature of brain systems (Luria, 1973), as well as their hierarchical nature
(Dean et al., 2003). Previous factor analytic studies support additional separate EF factors
(Boone et al., 1998) within a cognitive system; and correlational studies indicate that tests
of intelligence for children are not sensitive to executive abilities (Ardila, Pineda, &
Rosselli, 2000).
The joining of processing and skill based theories is proposed in this research
study, based on an extensive review of current literature. Utilizing contemporary state of
the art assessments for each component, the theory that executive control, attention, and
component cognitive skills function within a reciprocal processing hierarchy will be
tested. The procedure for this proposal will be enumerated in Chapter 3 of this study.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD

The methods chapter presents a description of the participants, instruments used,
and procedure for statistical analysis involved in this study. This study utilizes an
exploratory factor analytic design to evaluate executive control, attention, and the Gf-Gc
cognitive components measured by contemporary measures of attention and cognitive
abilities in children. Based on literature research analysis (refer to Chapter 2), prior
studies identified Crystallized Intelligence (Gc), Fluid Reasoning/Concept Formation
(Gf), Visual-Spatial Skills (Gv), Conscious Awareness/Short-term memory (Gsm), and
Processing Speed (Gs) factors (Keith et al., 2006) as measured by the WISC-IV test of
intelligence. This study proposes the addition of attention (proposed Gat) and Executive
Control (proposed Gec) into a child cognitive factor structure.
Also, in addition to the exploratory factor structure analysis, a structural equation
model will be formed to test the relationship between factors. In particular, components
of the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003) will be tested.
3.1

Participants
Data for this study were collected from an ongoing database of patients referred to

the Allegheny General Hospital Department of Psychiatry for a neuropsychological
evaluation. Subject data analyzed consisted of 225 children aged 6 to 16 years.
Determination of the minimum required sample size for structural equation model
analysis was completed prior to subject selection. Based on the Schumacker and Lomax
(1996) proposal of 10 subjects per variable, the proposed sample of this study, 225
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subjects for 15 observed variables, is adequate for analysis. The age range has been
defined between 6 to 16 years in order to follow the age restrictions for the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition (6 to 16 years) (Wechsler, 2003) and Conners’
Continuous Performance Test-II (6 years and up) (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).
Children can be referred for a neuropsychological assessment from a number of
different sources including their Primary Care Physician/Pediatrician, School District,
Psychiatrist, Mental Health Therapist, or through self-referral. To be included in the
study each participant has a Full Scale IQ score in the borderline range or higher (FSIQ ≥
70). Children receiving scores in the mental retardation range (FSIQ ≤ 69) were
excluded from this study in order to control for skill dysfunction due to global cognitive
deficit.
The majority of children referred for evaluation to the Allegheny General
Hospital Department of Psychiatry are males. In part because of this disparity, gender
differences were not investigated. Previous studies have found relatively few sex
differences on measures of executive functioning (Davies & Rose, 1999), and it seems
that both girls and boys develop executive functioning skills at similar rates (Anderson,
2002). Davies and Rose (1999) found that differences in executive functioning between
males and females were related to some visual spatial tasks, but these differences
depended on the type of visual spatial task administered.
3.2.

Measures
Standardized assessments that were used for this study include the Wechsler

Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Ed. (WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous
Performance Test (CPT-II). The study participants represented the norm group
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characteristics of each test in terms of age, gender, geographic location, and ethnic
background. The tests were selected from a comprehensive battery of tests given to
children referred for neuropsychological assessment to determine etiological factors.
They are considered valid and reliable estimates of the corresponding abilities measured.
3.2.1.

Conners’ Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Ed. (CPT-II)

The CPT-II is a computer administered test measuring attention to task, vigilance
(sustained attention), and the ability to inhibit motor response (Conners & MHS Staff,
2002). The test requires a respondent to press a space bar or mouse button when any
letter appears except the letter “X”. The inter-stimulus interval changes randomly through
six time blocks based on a person’s performance versus average response times. The test
lasts for 14 minutes with no break. This assessment can be administered to individuals
six years of age and older (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).
Five scores from the CPT-II were analyzed in this study as observed variables of
executive control and attention: Omission Errors, Commission Errors, Hit Reaction Time,
Hit Reaction Time Standard Error, and Variability of Standard Error. Barkley, Edwards,
Laneri, Fletcher, and Metevia (2001) completed a factor analysis of tasks of executive
functioning, temporal reward discounting, and time estimation and reproduction. The
factor solution identified these five variables as measuring inattention and inhibition
(executive control), and provides support for the selection of CPT-II variables in this
study.
The two scores used to analyze impulsive responding (executive control) are
number of Commissions (# of Commissions) and Hit Reaction Time (Hit RT).
Commissions are the number of times a respondent reacts to non-target stimuli. Hit
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Reaction Time is the mean response time measured in milliseconds. Low T-scores for
Hit Reaction Time indicate a fast response time. The response criterion and response
speed of the individual taking the test affect their number of commissions. Slow
response time, in the presence of a high number of omission and commission errors
indicates inattention, while a high number of commission errors and a fast response time
indicate an impulsive response style (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).
The scores that used to measure attention are Omission Errors (# of omissions),
Hit Reaction Time Standard Error (Hit RT SE), and Variability of Standard Error
(Variability of SE). Omission errors are the number of times which an examinee did not
respond to a target item and reflects inattention to stimuli (Barkley et al., 2001). Hit RT
SE acts as a measure of consistency between response times. A high degree of variability
between response times can indicate inattentiveness (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002). The
measure Variability of SE also reflects variability of response times, but in contrast to Hit
RT SE, Variability of SE indicates the inconsistency in response time with relation to an
individual’s standard error.
Below (Table 3.1) is a table of the Split-Half reliability coefficients from the
CPT-II manual of the measures used in this study.
Table 3.1
CPT-II Split-Half reliability coefficients
Variable

Reliability

# of Commissions

r12= .83

# of Omissions

r12= .94

Hit RT

r12= .95
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Hit RT SE

r12= .87

Variability of SE

r12= .66

r12=split-half reliability coefficients

Also, through validity studies conducted during standardization of the CPT-II, it
was determined that the CPT-II test discriminates accurately between ADHD and nonADHD groups (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002; Epstein, Erkanli, Conners, Klaric, Costello,
& Angold, 2003). Discriminant validity is supported by the ability of the CPT-II to
identify correctly between clinical versus non-clinical groups. Both the reliability and
validity coefficients are considered within acceptable limits to account for true score and
predictive values (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002).
3.2.2.

Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Ed. (WISC-IV)

In 1944 Wechsler defined intelligence as “…capacity of the individual to act
purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment.” The
WISC-IV is the newest revision of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children series
that is used as a broad measure of intelligence for children aged 6 years to 16 years, 11
months. The WISC-IV is based on a model that states a child’s estimate of global
functioning (Full-Scale IQ) is determined by measures of Verbal Comprehension (VCI),
Perceptual Reasoning (PRI), Working Memory (WMI), and Processing Speed (PSI).
The revision of the WISC brought many changes to the look and feel of the test.
Five new subtests have been added, and four of the remaining subtests have been
modified for improvement. The Verbal Comprehension Index subtests include:
Similarities, Vocabulary, Comprehension, Information, and Word Reasoning. These
subtests assess a child’s verbal abilities related to reasoning, comprehension, and
conceptualization.
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The Perceptual Reasoning Index subtests include: Block Design, Picture
Concepts, Matrix Reasoning, and Picture Completion. This index assesses perceptual
reasoning and organization. The Perceptual Reasoning Index replaced the Performance
Intelligence Quotient on previous versions of the WISC series, and reflects an increased
emphasis on fluid intelligence, or the ability to manipulate novel information.
The Working Memory Index subtests include: Digit Span (forward and
backward), Letter-Number Sequencing, and Arithmetic. This index assesses a child’s
attention, concentration, and working memory. It replaced the Freedom from
Distractibility Index on previous versions of the WISC series.
The Processing Speed Index measures a child’s speed of processing for mental
and graphomotor tasks. The subtests for this index include: Coding, Symbol Search, and
Cancellation.
The WISC-IV allows for a wide range of interpretation, from indices measuring a
variety of a child’s skills, such as the global Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; to the small
detail provided though process analysis of individual responses. The WISC-IV also
lowered test floors and raised test ceilings from previous versions. There has been the
addition of both easier and more difficult items on all the subtests.
Several studies have analyzed the WISC-IV in order to better understand the
constructs it measures (Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, & Kranzler, 2006;
Wechsler, 2003). Wechsler (2003) compared the four WISC-IV factors (Verbal
Comprehension, Perceptual Reasoning, Working Memory, and Processing Speed) to the
11 domains of functioning explained by the Cattell, Horn, and Carroll (1993) theory of
cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2003). The Gf (Fluid Reasoning), Gc (Crystallized
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Knowledge), Gs (Processing Speed), Gv (Visual Spatial Abilities), Gsm (Short-term
Memory), and Gq (Quantitative Knowledge), broad band domains can be identified in
measurements included in the recent WISC revision. However, Wechsler (2003)
continues to delineate the WISC-IV factors as Verbal Comprehension (VC), Perceptual
Reasoning (PR), Working Memory (WM), and Processing Speed (PS).
The study conducted by Keith et al. (2006) further explores Wechsler’s (2003)
analysis and challenges the current factor structure. By using a higher order confirmatory
factor analysis Keith et al. (2006) identified a model defined by the factors Gc, Gv, Gf,
Gsm, and Gs.
The following table (Table 3.2) lists the WISC-IV subtests, current index factor
structure (Wechsler, 2003), and proposed cross-validated factor structure determined by
Keith et al. (2006):
Table 3.2
WISC-IV current index factor structure
Subtest
Similarities²

Index Score
Verbal Comprehension
Index (VCI)

CHC Domain(s)
Gc

Vocabulary²

VCI

Gc

Comprehension²

VCI

Gc

Information

VCI

Gc

Word Reasoning¹

VCI

Gc

Block Design²

Perceptual Reasoning Index
(PRI)

Gv

Picture Concepts¹,²

PRI

Gf

Matrix Reasoning²

PRI

Gf, Gv

Picture Completion

PRI

Gv, Gc
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Digit Span²

Working Memory Index
(WMI)

Gsm

Letter-Number Sequencing²

WMI

Gsm

Arithmetic

WMI

Gf

Processing Speed Index

Coding²

(PSI)

Gs

Symbol Search²

PSI

Gs, Gv

Cancellation¹

PSI

Gs

¹These subtests are new additions to the WISC testing series. The proposed Gf-Gc domains measured by
these tests were determined from an analysis of similar tasks on other preexisting normed tests.
²These subtests are considered the core subtests, and necessary to determine the Full-Scale IQ score.

Scores that will be used for analysis include the scaled scores for each of the ten
core subtests (Similarities, Vocabulary, Comprehension, Block Design, Picture Concepts,
Matrix Reasoning, Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Coding, and Symbol Search).
Supplemental WISC-IV subtests will not be included in this study, because they were not
routinely administered as part of the sample subject assessment battery. Not including
the supplemental subtests may be a limitation of this study. Keith et al. (2006) suggest
using all WISC-IV subtests in order to fully understand the constructs measured.
Below is a table (Table 3.3) of the psychometric properties of the scores used
from the WISC-IV, which reflects both a reliable and valid measure.
Table 3.3
WISC-IV reliability and validity coefficients
Variable

Reliability

Validity

Block Design

r1= .86

r2= .771

Similarities

r1= .86

r2= .761

Coding

r1= .85

r2= .761

Vocabulary

r1= .89

r2= .821

64

Picture Concepts

r1= .82

r2= .442

Comprehension

r1= .81

r2= .621

Digit Span

r1= .87

r2= .771

Matrix Reasoning

r1= .89

r2= .692

Letter-Number Seq.

r1= .90

r2= .693

Symbol Search

r1= .79

r2= .671

r1= internal consistency coefficient (Wechsler, 2003)
r2= corrected correlation coefficient (Wechsler, 2003)
1
= correlated to WISC-III (Wechsler, 2003)
2
= correlated to WPPSI-III (Wechsler, 2003)
3
= correlated to WAIS-III (Wechsler, 2003)

3.3.

Procedure
Children referred for a neuropsychological evaluation at Allegheny General

Hospital Department of Psychiatry are routinely administered a comprehensive battery of
neuropsychological tests, which generally includes the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children, 4th ed. and Conner’s Continuous Performance Test-II.
Each child may also complete self report measures, including the Achenbach
Youth Self Report, Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, and Children’s
Depression Inventory. In addition to individual assessments, one or both of the child’s
parents complete several parent report measures including the Behavior Rating Inventory
of Executive Functioning, the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist, and a
Neurodevelopmental History form. Each of these instruments contributes valuable
variance when evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of children. Test choice for each
assessment remains fluid, and may eliminate or add to the above list of tests.
The assessment procedures for each of the cases in the database were
administered by either a board certified neuropsychologist, psychometrist, pre- or postdoctoral psychology intern, or psychology student trained in the administration of
neuropsychological measures with the direct supervision of a board certified
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neuropsychologist. All diagnostic determinations were made by a board certified
neuropsychologist.
3.4.

Data Analysis
This study utilizes an exploratory factor analytic design evaluating a factor

structure proposed from 15 indicator variables. The purpose of an exploratory factor
analysis method is to reduce a set of variables, i.e. scores on tests, to smaller number of
latent variables (Garson, 2005). Latent variables, or factors, are those occurrences that
cannot be directly observed (Byrne, 1998). The latent variables hypothesized by this
study were indicated by prior research. They include Gc, Gf, Gv, Gsm, Gs, Gat, and Gec.
This analysis is exploratory, as opposed to confirmatory, because even though
separate studies (Barkley, 2001; Keith et al., 2006) validate the separate Gf-Gc and
attention factors, combining the two within one model adds method variance that cannot
be explained as confirmatory. Factor analysis utilizes observed variables as indicators of
the latent Gf-Gc expanded variables (Byrne, 1998) proposed in this research. Specifically,
the SPSS computer program will be used to run the initial exploratory factor analysis.
The initial factor analysis will set the stage for the second step of this study, which is the
cognitive model verification. Validation of the proposed Gc, Gf, Gv, Gsm, Gs, Gat, and Gec
constructs is needed to fully evaluate the modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology
model (Dean et al., 2003) outlined in Figure 1.1.
The structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to factor analysis will be used
in this study to evaluate the relationship between proposed cognitive constructs. The
AMOS computer program was used to evaluate this study’s SEM factor structure. The
SEM method evaluates the variance, as well as covariance, between variables (Garson,
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2005). The link between observed variables and the underlying latent factors is
fundamental, with regression path strengths between the variables and factors being used
to help define the causal relationship (Byrne, 1998). Structural Equation Modeling
utilizes both a measurement model and structural model to understanding the
relationships between observed variables and factors, as well as between each factor. The
measurement model represents the relationship between observed and latent variables,
and the structural model illustrates the relationship between each of the latent variables.
A full model combines both the structural and measurement models and provides an
estimation of the inter- and intra-relationships between unobserved and observed
variables (Byrne, 1998).
The focus of the SEM approach is to determine the goodness of fit between the
sample data and the proposed model. Byrne (1998) describes the process of fitting the
data into the model as: Data = Model + Residual. In this case residual represents the
discrepancy between the observed data and proposed model.
Given that the hypothesis includes adding new Gat and Gec factors into the already
established Gf-Gc cognitive model, the framework for testing the structural equation
models in this study will follow the most common type of SEM called the model
generating approach (Byrne, 1998). The model generating approach allows this study to
propose a model based on standing theory, either reject or accept the model based on
goodness of fit, and modify the rejected model in a way that represents a better fit to the
data.
Several goodness of fit statistics will be used to analyze both the Gf-Gc expanded
model and modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, including Chi square (χ2),
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Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Parsimony Comparative Fit Index
(PCFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The Chi square statistic is a measure of the fit
of the covariance matrix to the restricted covariance matrix (Byrne, 1998). Relative to the
degrees of freedom, a small χ2 indicates a good fit and a large χ2 indicates a poor fit
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). RMSEA is a fit statistic sensitive to the complexity of the
model being tested. Guidelines for the RMSEA are values nearing zero; however, values
between .05-.08 indicate good fit (Byrne, 1998). The PCFI accounts for the number of
estimated parameters (52 in this study) when measuring the overall fit of the
hypothesized model. The PCFI represents the goodness of fit of the model and the
parsimony of the model through one statistic (Byrne, 1998). Finally, the CFI statistics
range from 0.0 to 1.0, with values >0.90 indicating good fit (Bentler, 1992; Byrne, 1998).
Selection of these statistics was based on prior analytic research in the areas of cognition
(Holland et al., 2004; Keith et al., 2006).
3.4.1

Evaluation of Assumptions

There are several assumptions that will be tested during the course of the SEM
statistical procedure. Sample size and missing data will be assessed. For this study there
are 225 subjects and 15 observed variables. The sample size of 225 individuals exceeds
the Schumacker and Lomax (1996) proposal of 10 subjects per variable. Given this
sample will be pulled from an already existing database, and therefore subject selection
can be more restricted, missing data is not predicted to impact this study.
A test of normality and linearity will be conducted to determine skewness and
kurtosis. The skewness and kurtosis statistics are used to evaluate distribution of scores.
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Ideally these statistics will be as close to zero as possible (Holland et al., 2004), however
statistics between 0 and 1.0 can be considered acceptable (Huck & Cormier, 1996).
An additional assumption is that the constructs in this study previously held up
across age ranges (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002; Wechsler, 2003). This study will
evaluate whether this remains true for the current sample by measuring age continuously.
A continuous correlations test will be done to investigate developmental implications of
construct measurement.
3.4.2

Variables and Models

This study’s hypothesis identifies two separate models: the first is a seven factor
model reflecting the inclusion of Gat and Gec into the Gf-Gc cognitive structure; and the
second model fits the seven factors into a reciprocal processing hierarchy to test the
relationship between factors.
The hypothesized seven factor model (Figure 3.1) identifies Gf (matrix reasoning
and picture concepts as indicators), Gc (similarities, vocabulary, and comprehension as
indicators), Gv (matrix reasoning and block design as indicators), Gsm (letter-number
sequencing and digit span as indicators), Gs (Coding and symbol search as indicators), Gat
(# of Omissions, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE), and Gec (# of commissions and Hit
RT as indicators) as factors measured by the 15 variables. This model being presented
questions whether a seven factor model fits the data.
Each separate construct will be measured by the specified measurement variables.
The model represents an organization of cognitive constructs that are measured by subtest
scores on the WISC-IV and CPT-II. Note the arrows from each construct (circle) pointing
to corresponding measurement variables (box). The arrow represents variance. This
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proposed model has each construct measured by at least 2 variables. Also, with the
exception of Matrix Reasoning loading on both Gf and Gv, each variable loads on one
construct.
Figure 3.1 Hypothesized seven factor model including Gf-Gc components, Gat, and Gec
Matrix Reasoning

Gf

Picture Concepts
Vocabulary

Gc

Comprehension
Similarities

Gv

Block Design
Letter-Number
Sequencing

Gsm

Digit Span
Symbol Search

Gs

Coding
# of Omissions

Gat

Hit RT SE
Variability of SE
Hit RT

Gec

# of Commissions

A check of identifiability (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) indicates that the seven
factor Gf-Gc expanded model proposed in this study is over-identified, and therefore able
to be solved uniquely (Stevens, 2002). There are 120 identified data points (with 15
variables, 15(15+1)/2=120 data points). The model hypothesized includes 52 parameters
to be estimated (15 regression coefficients, 21 covariances, and 16 variances). Therefore,
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with 68 degrees of freedom (120-52) the model is over-identified (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2001).
The second model (Figure 3.2) reflects a modified version of the Dean et al.
(2003) representation of the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model. This model
proposes a process between attention, conscious awareness/short term memory, fluid
reasoning, visual spatial ability, crystallized intelligence, processing speed, and executive
control.
Recall the explanation of the Dean et al. (2003) model posed in Chapter 2. Dean
et al. (2003) advocate for a hierarchy of skills within an information processing model.
The executive control system acts as a gatekeeper directing the path of automatic versus
non-automatic/novel processes. This system is also responsible for allocation of attention
and monitoring of performance. The addition of attention as a separate factor in the
modified model shown below (Figure 3.2) reflects Luria’s (1973) contention that an
attention system must first be on-line in order for subsequent mental processes to occur.
The arrows in this diagram reflect how well one factor predicts another (Holland et al.,
2004), which inherently helps determine the relationship between the constructs.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a cognitive structure explained by a process between
component skills. Attention directly affects short term memory, which in turn affects the
ability to complete tasks requiring processing speed, fluid reasoning, and visual-spatial
skills. Fluid skills and visual spatial skills affect the processing of stored knowledge,
which processes simultaneously through executive control. The executive control
component is affected by how quickly information can be processed. Figure 3.2 explains
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task completion and skill delivery from beginning (primary skill) to completion
(product).
Figure 3.2 Modified Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology model, with attention added as a
primary component.

Gf

Stores of
Acquired
Knowledge
(Gc)

Gv

Gsm

Gs

Gec

Gat

Gec=
Gs=
Gat=
Gsm=
Gf=
Gv=
G c=

3.4.3.

Executive Control
Processing Speed
Attention
Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness
Fluid Intelligence
Visual Spatial Ability
Crystallized Intelligence

Research Questions

1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006)
literature, with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).
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a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is
accounted for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control,
and CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will
be dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive
control in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent
on the hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by
Figure 3.2, with respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003)
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

The main objective of the current study is to explore the possibility of a higher
order processing relationship between cognitive skills that includes Gf-Gc Components
Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual
Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence, as well as executive control and attention.
A description of the study’s variables will first be presented, followed by summarization
of research questions and the corresponding results. Factor analytic and structural
equation modeling procedures will be reviewed as they answer each of the research
questions.
4.1.

Descriptive Statistics
The statistics describing the study sample are presented in Table 4.1. A majority

of the respondents were male (71.6%) and were Caucasian (86.2%). Age in months of
children tested ranged from 74 to 208. The mean age of children tested was 130.16
months (SD = 33.74).
The means and standard deviations for the fifteen indicator variables are
presented in Table 4.2. The skewness and kurtosis of the distribution of these variables
are also presented in Table 4.2. As referred to in this table, the WISC-IV Letter Number
Sequencing had a high kurtosis value. The CPT-II Number of Omissions variable had
very high skew and kurtosis values. All other variables had acceptable skew and kurtosis
values.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics of Study Sample (N = 225)
Variables

Frequency

Percentage

Male

161

71.6

Female

64

28.4

Caucasian

194

86.2

Other

31

13.8

Sex

Ethnicity

The correlations between the indicator variables are presented in Table 4.3. The
WISC-IV subtests were generally correlated with each other. Only the Similarities and
Vocabulary subtests were not significantly correlated with the Coding subtest. The
WISC-IV subtests were correlated with four of the five the CPT-II measures. The WISCIV subtests were generally not significantly related to the Number of Commissions.
Correlations between Age and the indicator variables were completed in order to
investigate the stability of the constructs across age. Since age was not presented
categorically, meaning in set age ranges, a continuous test was performed. Pearson
correlations were conducted. If variable 1 is measured on an interval/ratio scale and
variable 2 is measured on an interval/ratio scale – as age and the IQ tests were, then the
Pearson r procedure is used (Garson, 2008). A continuous test measures the correlations
of each test repeatedly cross ages, thus giving an indication as to developmental stability.
The results are presented in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4 shows correlational significance across age for Vocabulary, LetterNumber Sequencing, Number of Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE.
The directionality and strength of the correlations between age and indicator variables in
this situation indicate that older children tended to have better developed abilities on
those tests. Of note, based on these findings attention seems to improve with age, which
corresponds to contemporary understanding of the development of attention (Conners &
MHS Staff, 2002; Lezak, 1995). As age increases, the number of omissions and
inconsistency in response time decrease in this sample. Given that decreases in both of
these scores indicate better attention (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002); this finding reflects
an improvement in attention that occurs developmentally as age increases.
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics for Indicator Variables, Part One (N = 225)
Variable

Range

Mean

SD

Skewness
Statistic

Skewness Std.
Error

Kurtosis Statistic

Kurtosis Std.
Error

Similarities

1 to 18

9.88

2.89

-.16

.16

-.01

.32

Vocabulary

3 to 16

9.26

2.58

.13

.16

-.35

.32

Comprehension

1 to 15

8.86

2.73

-.19

.16

-.03

.32

Block design

1 to 19

9.45

2.90

.09

.16

.11

.32

Picture concepts

1 to 18

10.56

2.78

-.37

.16

.80

.32

Matrix reasoning

2 to 18

9.57

2.70

.07

.16

.08

.32

Digit span

2 to 16

8.85

2.76

.18

.16

-.39

.32

Letter-number sequencing

1 to 19

9.01

2.78

-.37

.16

1.54

.32

Coding

1 to 17

7.93

2.94

.09

.16

-.22

.32

Symbol search

1 to 15

8.96

2.89

-.50

.16

.31

.32

Number of omissions

34 to 117

51.48

11.59

2.14

.16

6.18

.32

Number of commissions

23 to 72

52.54

9.95

-.54

.16

-.28

.32

Hit RT

21 to 79

46.89

11.49

.51

.16

.00

.32

Hit RT SE

25 to 82

51.25

10.70

-.04

.16

-.44

.32

Variability of SE

24 to 72

51.09

10.45

-.19

.16

-.77

.32

WISC-IV

CPT-II
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Table 4.3
Correlations between Indicator Variables
Variable

V1

V2

V3

V4

V5

V6

V7

V8

V9

V10

V11

V12

V13

V14

W Similarities (V1)
W Vocabulary (V2)

.64**

W Comprehension (V3)

.53**

.63**

W Block (V4)

.35**

.35**

.20**

W Picture (V5)

.39**

.39**

.30**

.25**

W Matrix (V6)

.35**

.41**

.27**

.41**

.36**

W Digit (V7)

.36**

.33**

.32**

.16*

.32**

.27**

W Letter (V8)

.33**

.35**

.34**

.20**

.27**

.26**

.29**

W Coding (V9)

.11

.13

.17*

.27**

.21**

.09

.11

.21**

W Symbol (V10)

.26**

.22**

.23**

.33**

.16*

.16*

.14*

.25**

.55**

CPT Omissions (V11)

-.27**

-.22**

-.19**

-.12

-.29**

-.29**

-.25**

-.25**

-.08

-.11

.05

-.06

-.09

-.11

-.09

-.16*

-.11

-.05

-.14*

-.07

.05

CPT Hit (V13)

-.22**

-.22**

-.16*

-.09

-.16*

-.15*

-.15*

-.19**

-.17*

-.21**

.40**

-.41**

CPT HitSE (V14)

-.22**

-.29**

-.28**

-.10

-.20**

-.28**

-.22**

-.25**

-.16*

-.17**

.60**

.09

.71**

CPT Variability (V15)

-.21**

-.27**

-.30**

-.08

-.19**

-.31**

-.23**

-.20**

-.15*

-.15*

.59**

.19**

.52**

CPT Commissions (V12)

* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01
W = WISC-IV
CPT = CPT-II
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.94**

Table 4.4
Correlations between Age and Indicator Variables (N = 225)
Indicator Variable

Age

WISC Similarities

.095

WISC Vocabulary

.145*

WISC Comprehension

.065

WISC Block Design

.038

WISC Picture Concepts

.125

WISC Matrix Reasoning

.118

WISC Digit Span

-.029

WISC Letter-Number

.181**

WISC Coding

-.121

WISC Symbol Search

-.029

CPT # of Omissions

-.288**

CPT # of Commissions

.024

CPT Hit RT

-.387**

CPT Hit RT SE

-.368**

CPT Variability of SE

-.283**

* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01
4.2.

Research Question 1
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the
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components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006) literature,
with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).
a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is accounted
for and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
4.3.

Exploratory Factor Analysis
An exploratory factor analytic procedure was conducted to test whether the

WISC-IV subtests and the CPT-II measures would yield the 7 hypothesized components
shown in Figure 3.1. The extraction method specified was principal components analysis
(PCA) and the rotation method requested was an orthogonal Varimax rotation. Principle
components analysis was used because it assumes unique variance of components, versus
elimination of unique variance as in procedures such as Principal axis factor analysis
(PAF) (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Due to the nature of the separation of cognitive skills outlined in the literature (Keith et
al., 2006; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005;
Norman & Shallice, 1986; Phelps et al., 2005), exclusion of unique variance was thought
to be a shortcoming of the PAF procedure for use in this study; therefore, PCA was
chosen as a more appropriate factor analysis method.
Orthogonal Varimax rotation was selected because it assumes that the variables
are uncorrelated and maximizes large loadings (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Varimax
indicates that each component has a few large loadings and more loadings of zero. This
simplifies interpretation because after Varimax each original variable tends to be
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associated with one (or small #) of components, and each components represents only a
small # of variables (Abdi, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Literature review for this
study supports orthogonal rotation because of the distinct separation of cognitive
components (Keith et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 2005), executive control, and attention
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Norman &
Shallice, 1986).
The PCA analysis yielded four components, accounting for 62.99% of the
variance. The eigenvalues and the variance explained by each of the components are
presented in Table 4.5. The components and their corresponding variables are presented
in Table 4.6. The criterion for eigenvalue selection was set at the default value of 1.
Table 4.5
Variance Explained by Resulting Components
Component

Eigenvalue

1

4.68

Eigenvalue % of
Variance
31.22

2

2.03

13.50

3

1.42

9.46

4

1.32

8.81

As can be seen in Table 4.6, the first component consists primarily of the WISCIV subtests. The Similarities, Vocabulary, and Comprehension subtests loaded highly
onto the first component. The Picture Concepts, Matrix Reasoning, Digit Span, and
Letter Number Sequencing subtests loaded moderately onto the first component.
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Accordingly, this component could be labeled as a combined Gf-Gc, including both Fluid
and Crystallized abilities.
Table 4.6
Indicator Variable Loadings (Rotated Matrix)
Variable

Component
1

2

3

4

WISC Similarities

.80

-.06

.09

.19

WISC Vocabulary

.82

-.11

.07

.07

WISC Comprehension

.71

-.13

.08

.03

WISC Block Design

.45

.05

.45

-.10

WISC Picture Concepts

.58

-.14

.12

-.08

WISC Matrix Reasoning

.57

-.23

.07

-.24

WISC Digit Span

.55

-.18

.00

-.10

WISC Letter-Number

.48

-.17

.25

.02

WISC Coding

.05

-.10

.86

-.07

WISC Symbol Search

.18

-.07

.83

.06

CPT # of Omissions

-.25

.72

.01

.04

CPT # of Commissions

-.06

.08

-.10

.93

CPT Hit RT

-.11

.68

-.18

-.60

CPT Hit RT SE

-.17

.95

-.10

-.04

CPT Variability of SE

-.18

.92

-.06

.12
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The second component consists primarily of four CPT-II measures: number of
Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE. The HIT RT SE and Variability of
SE loaded highly onto this component, and the number of Omissions and HIT RT loaded
moderately onto this component. Recall, number of Omissions, Hit RT SE, and
Variability of SE were proposed as CPT-II subtests measuring attention. Accordingly,
this component could be labeled Gat, Attention.
Both the Symbol Search and Coding subtests load highly onto the third
component. Accordingly, this component could be labeled Gs, Processing Speed.
The fourth component includes only one CPT-II measure with a high loading, the
Number of Commissions. However, Hit RT also loaded moderately on this component.
This supports Component 4 as the executive control component, because while a high #
of commissions indicates impulsivity (lack of executive control), a low Hit RT also
indicates impulsivity (-.60). In addition, a high HIT RT may indicate attentiveness, but
only in conjunction with other scores being either high or low. So the Hit RT may be
more accurately interpreted on component 4 (Gec) rather than component 2 (Gat).
Containing both number of Commissions and Hit RT, this component could be labeled
Gec, Executive Control.
Although the results do not correspond with previous findings of a fivecomponent model of cognition including Processing Speed, Short Term
Memory/Conscious Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and
Crystallized Intelligence (Keith et al, 2006), the results provide partial evidence that
Attention and Executive Control constitute two components separate from traditional GfGc structure. However, because Hit RT did not load significantly onto component 4, it
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will be eliminated from the structural equation model in order to maximize statistical fit.
Therefore, the component Gec cannot be analyzed in the structural equation model
because it cannot be statistically defined as a component since it is the only variable
which shows a significant relationship with Gec.
4.4.

Research Question 2
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, and
Gf-Gc stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will be
dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive control
in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent on the
hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by Figure 3.2, with
respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.
a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003)
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?

4.5.

Relationships between the Constructs
Structural equation modeling procedures were conducted to examine the

relationships between the four hypothesized constructs, with Attention and Executive
Control added. However, because the component Gec was not statistically identified with
at least two indicator variables, rather only through clinical interpretation, it was not fully
represented in the SEM as a separate factor.
EFA Model One (Figure 4.1) tested the relationship between the components
represented by all WISC-IV subtests and CPT-II sub-scores number of omissions,
number of commissions, and variability of SE. EFA Model Two (Figure 4.2) included
only the WISC-IV subtests that loaded highly onto the first component, but kept the other

84

components the same as Model One. Note that Hit RT and Hit RT SE were omitted from
analyses, because the variance of the error was negative, and thus, the solution generated
was “inadmissible.”
The model presented in Figure 4.1 did not fit the data very well: χ2 = 153.492 (df
= 62), p = .000, CFI = .876, PCFI = .697, and RMSEA = .081. The CFI index was below
the acceptable benchmark of .90 and the RMSEA value of .08 indicates moderate fit (Hu
& Bentler, 1999).
The indicator variables were all significantly correlated to their constructs. Only
one of four standardized path coefficients was statistically significant. In particular, Gat
was significantly related to Gs (r = -.28, p = .05). The path coefficient between Gs and Gec
was not significant. Similarly, the path coefficients between Gec and Gf-Gc were not
significant.
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Figure 4.1 Results for EFA Model One

Matrix Reasoning
.51**
.82**

Picture Concepts

.51**

Gf-Gc

.70**

Comprehension

.47**
.76**

LN Sequencing

Similarities

.46**
.45**

Digit Span
3.75

-2.88

Block Design
-1.70

Gec

Gs
.68**
.79**
-.28*

Symbol Search

Omissions
.65**

Gat

.91**

Variability of SE

* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01
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Coding

Figure 4.2 Results for EFA Model Two

Vocabulary
.86**

Gf-Gc

.74**

Comprehension

.74**

Similarities

2.73

-2.44

-1.09

Gec

Gs
.68**
.79**
-.26*

Symbol Search

Omissions
.63**

Gat

.93**

Variability of SE

* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01
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Coding

The three-component model presented in Figure 4.2 fit the data well: χ2 = 46.261
(df = 17), p = .000, CFI = .937, PCFI = .569, and RMSEA = .088. The CFI index was
above the acceptable benchmark of .90; however, the RMSEA of .088 is slightly above
an acceptable range of values of .05-.08 for moderate fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A higher
RMSEA value reflects a larger difference between the estimated model and actual model
determined by the analysis.
The indicator variables were all significantly correlated to their constructs. Only
one of four standardized path coefficients was statistically significant. In particular, Gat
was significantly related to Gs (r = -.26, p = .05). The path coefficient between Gs and
Gec was not significant. Similarly, the path coefficients between Gec and Gf-Gc were not
significant.
4.6.

Summary for Structural Equation Model Results
The model that fit the data best was the three component model presented in

Figure 4.2. But given that models with fewer parameters generally fit data better, it is
difficult to conclude which model accurately represents a hierarchical model of cognitive
functioning.
Also, the models described in this research have never been tested with the
addition of attention and executive control components. A model including all of the
WISC-IV cognitive components (Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious
Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence) has
been verified through other intelligence research literature (Keith et al., 2006), but the
presence of the additional attention and executive functioning components is suggested in
this research through the results of the factor analytic procedure.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

5.1

Purpose
The purpose of this study is to continue investigation of the Gf-Gc theory and

expand the Keith et al. (2006) validation of Gf-Gc measurement by the WISC-IV. This
study explored the inclusion of a new Executive Control (Gec) component and a separate
attention component (Gat) within the Gf-Gc theory. This study involves an investigation of
the Gf-Gc domains measured by Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 4th Edition
(WISC-IV) and Conners’ Continuous Performance Test, 2nd Edition (CPT-II). These
domains were compared via principal components analysis of the WISC-IV and CPT-II.
Also, the relationship of these cognitive components was examined. The second
main purpose of this research is to test the structure of the Dean-Woodcock
Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al., 2003). The inclusion of Gec and Gat components
questions the primacy of each component within the Dean-Woodcock (2003) model.
Analysis of the cognitive domains measured by the WISC-IV, and attention and
executive control, as measured by the CPT-II, shed light on the relationship between
executive control, attention, and measures of cognitive ability in children.
5.2

Summary and Results of Research Question 1
1. Are there additional components, in addition to Gf-Gc, that further explain
cognitive functioning and processes? Confirming data would include the
components Gf, Gc, Gs, Gv, and Gsm delineated in the Keith et al (2006) literature,
with the addition of attention (Gat) and executive control (Gec).
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a. Does executive control constitute a separate construct than is accounted for
and measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
b. Does attention constitute a separate construct than is accounted for and
measured by cognitive tests of Gf-Gc theory?
Results of this exploratory factor analysis indicate the combination of WISC-IV
and CPT-II measure four separate components of cognitive skill. The first component
was labeled as Gf/Gc, as it includes combined crystallized and fluid reasoning skills
(Keith et al., 2006). The second component was labeled Gat representing the attention as
measured by the CPT-II. The third component represents speed of information processing
and will be labeled Gs. The final component, measured by two CPT-II scores that indicate
impulsive responding, was labeled as Gec as a measure of executive control.
Although the exploratory factor analysis results do not support previous findings
of five-component cognitive functioning model (Keith et al., 2006), the results provide
partial evidence that Attention and Executive Control constitute two components separate
from traditional Gf-Gc structure, as will be discussed further in the conclusions section of
this chapter.
5.3.

Summary and Results of Research Question 2
2. What is the structure of the relationship between attention, executive control, and
CHC stratum II components measured by the WISC-IV? This model will be
dependent first on verification of the presence of attention and executive control
in research question #1. The second step of this question is dependent on the
hypothesis that the components fit a model that is represented by Figure 3.2, with
respect to Gf-Gc, and attention and executive control.
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a. Does the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model (Dean et al, 2003)
accurately represent the relationship between cognitive components?
Structural Equation Modeling was used to answer the second research question.
This analysis took the identified four components: fluid reasoning/crystallized ability,
processing speed, attention, and executive control, and investigated possible reciprocal
relationship between the cognitive skills. Results of this analysis provide limited evidence
for a structure in which attention assumes a role of primacy, followed by speed of
processing, and finally a reciprocal relationship between executive control and
crystallized ability/fluid reasoning. However, since only the relationship between
attention and processing speed was statistically significant, the entire model of cognition
cannot be assumed.
As described in Chapter 4, the model presented in Figure 4.2 fit the data best, but
given that models with fewer parameters generally fit data better, it is difficult to
conclude whether this model accurately represents a hierarchical model of intelligence. In
addition, although a model including Processing Speed, Short Term Memory/Conscious
Awareness, Fluid Intelligence, Visual Spatial Ability, and Crystallized Intelligence has
been verified through other cognitive ability research literature (Keith et al., 2006), the
presence of the additional attention and executive control factors has never been tested.
Based on this research, there is not enough evidence to disconfirm that
components of the Dean Woodcock Neuropsychology Model accurately explain
cognitive skill relationships. Attention was identified as a primary skill necessary for the
initiation of other cognitive abilities; however, the full intact model could not be
evaluated.
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5.4.

Conclusions
5.4.1.

Attention and Executive Control as Separate Functions

The research literature for this study supported the separation of attention and
executive control as distinct cognitive skills. Multiple studies have analyzed the
relationship between cognitive functioning (Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005;
Floyd, Bergeron, & Hamilton, 2005; Keith, Goldenring Fine, Taub, Reynolds, &
Kranzler, 2006; Naglieri, Goldstein, Delauder, & Schwebach, 2005; Wechsler, 2003),
attention, and various executive abilities. However, a gap in the literature was noted with
regard to a lack of examination of a higher order processing relationship between
cognitive skills that includes all of the current Gf-Gc components, notably executive
control and attention.
The current study suggests the addition of separate attention (Gat) and executive
control (Gec) components within a Gf-Gc cognitive model. These findings are in line with
the conclusions of several studies (Luria, 1973; Naglieri et al., 2005) that indicate the
presence of a separate attention system. The principal components procedure identified
attention and makes it distinct from other cognitive skills. This is in contrast to Gf-Gc
studies (McGrew, 2003; McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; Keith et al., 2006) in which
attention was not indicated separately.
In addition, the current study provides partial evidence for the separation of
executive control (Gec) from attention and other component cognitive skills. In
conjunction with previous research (Busch, Booth, McBride, Vanderploeg, Curtiss, &
Duchnick, 2005; Duff, Schoenberg, Scott, & Adams, 2005; Norman & Shallice, 1986;
Minshew et al., 2002), Gec and Gat constitute distinct cognitive skills, and as such should
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be evaluated separately. Data backs Gec as separate factor; however, because of study
limitations this assertion must be retested.
The analysis of Gec for this study lies more in test interpretation rather than
statistical fit. That is, the presence of Gec was indicated in this study by clinical
interpretation of the relationships between specific CPT-II subtests. Test development
sets precedent for such interpretation (Conners & MHS Staff, 2002). Recall from Chapter
4, “…Component 4 as the executive control component, because while a high # of
commissions indicates impulsivity (lack of executive control), a low Hit RT also
indicates impulsivity (-.60). In addition, a high HIT RT may indicate attentiveness, but
only in conjunction with other scores being either high or low. So the Hit RT may be
more accurately interpreted on Gec rather than Gat. Containing both number of
Commissions and Hit RT, this component could be labeled Gec, Executive Control.”
However, caution is recommended when interpreting this finding, because Hit RT was
omitted from the following SEM analysis due to the variance of the error being negative.
Thus, the solution generated for a structural model including Hit RT was “inadmissible.
5.4.2.

Relationship between Cognitive Skills

The processing approach to cognition proposed in this research was not fully
validated. This is in contrast to multiple previous studies validating a similar model of
cognitive processing (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Dean et al., 2003; Kaufman &
Kaufman, 2004; Naglieri, 1999; Reitan, 1988). The best-fit model of cognitive processing
(Figure 4.2) shows that the only significant statistical correlation is between attention and
processing speed. The process between Gf-Gc cognitive skills, executive control, and
processing speed was not statistically significant, and as such did not validate a
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meaningful relationship using statistics alone. However, it is noted that this interpretation
should be made with caution. Because the component Gec was not statistically identified
with at least two indicator variables, rather only through clinical interpretation, it was not
fully represented in the SEM as a separate factor. This shortcoming likely affected the
model’s overall stability.
Although the model proposed by Dean et al. (2003) was not validated, the
presence of a significant correlation between attention and processing speed shows partial
support for an interactive relationship between cognitive skills as described in previous
research (Luria, 1973; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004;
Naglieri et al., 2005). This evidence is significant in that it shows attention as a necessary
skill for other resulting cognitive processes. This finding is in line with previous
literature, which outlines the possible primacy of attention and the hierarchical nature of
cognitive skills (Luria, 1973; Reitan, 1988; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Naglieri, 1999;
Dean et al., 2003; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).
Speculation based on these findings would point to the importance of measuring
attention ability prior to coming to conclusion about cognitive functioning based on
standard IQ testing. These results indicate a dependent relationship between one’s ability
to attend and one’s ability to complete any task requiring speed of information
processing. In conjunction with Dean et al.’s (2003) model expanding processing speed
to all other Gf-Gc abilities, one could then hypothesize, based on these findings, that
attention interacts with the remaining abilities outlined in the literature (Dean et al., 2003;
Keith et al., 2006).
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5.5.

Limitations
The first limitation of this study is the lack of cultural and sex diversity of the

sample, as well as the lack of a non-referred peer group. Although the sample size was
adequate for analysis, the population was clinically referred for cognitive, mental health,
or neuro-biological concerns. In addition, the sample consisted of primarily white males.
A study of this population versus a population of similar aged non-referred peers would
help determine whether the cognitive skills assessed presented differently given disability
and across gender and culture.
Another limitation of this study is that it assumes good performances on tasks
measuring attention and executive control abilities at a young age are synonymous with
good performances at older ages. Recall from Chapter 4, “Table 4.4 shows significance
mean differences across age for Vocabulary, Letter-Number Sequencing, Number of
Omissions, Hit RT, Hit RT SE, and Variability of SE. Significance in this situation
indicates that older children tended to have better developed abilities on those tests. Of
note, based on these findings attention improves with age.” This could have affected the
outcome of this study in that age was measured continuously rather than in age
categories, which doesn’t account for skill development and thus increase in skill
performance as kids get older. Categorical analysis better allows researchers to analyze
developmental skill acquisition. Future research could measure cognitive factors across
age through a multiple confirmatory factor analytic procedure across multiple age ranges.
The future analysis can be considered confirmatory because this study suggests the
presence of attention and executive control in a clinically referred population.
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An indication of these findings is that the measurement of attention and executive
control potential should be assessed developmentally within a cognitive structure during
childhood. Also, additional investigation of smaller age ranges may yield better agerelated construct stability, thus providing better data for developmentally related
progress.
5.6.

Recommendations for Future Research
The first recommendation for future research is to expand the factor analysis to

validate the presence of a separate executive control factor. While partial evidence was
found, this study was unable to provide the multiple variables necessary to authenticate
Gec as a distinct component. Such research should take the form of a confirmatory, rather
than exploratory factor analysis. Because the analysis of executive control was not yet
validated at the time of this research an exploratory analysis was indicated. However,
future research now has some basis by which to confirm Gec.
Although this research did not validate the proposed cognitive structure in it’s
entirety (i.e. the Dean-Woodcock Neuropsychology Model, 2003), the results are
promising for future analyses. This study provides evidence for the existence of attention
and executive control within a global Gf-Gc cognitive structure, as well as a relationship
between attention and processing speed. The additional cognitive structure, including the
reciprocal nature of the relationship between cognitive skills has been validated
separately. A final recommendation for future research is to first validate executive
control separately through confirmatory factor analysis, as stated above, and then reanalyze the cognitive model with attention as a primary component and including
executive control. Such a discovery could impact how professionals view the interactive
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nature of attention, executive control, and specific cognitive skills because it would
provide a better understanding of primacy in cognitive skill performance.
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